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This thesis presents an analysis of past and present
American and International hospital ships with the goal of
categorizing Technical, Political and Cultural (TPC)
influences. The theoretical framework for such an effort is
the TPC Theory advocated by Noel M. Tichy. Configuration
Management (CM) is offered to the reader as a unique
managerial and integrative mechanism for controlling,
coordinating and implementing TPC influences in a Department
of Defense system such as the 1980' s hospital ship project.
The author concludes that a successful merging of TPC Theory
and Configuration Management is a possible and desired
result. Recommendations include utilizing the TPC/CM ideas
in future Naval Medical Command systems and specific
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The main theme running through this thesis is evolution
and the management of change. The author is primarily
interested in the evolution of past and present American
hospital ships. This interest is expressed in comparing the
changes that have occurred over the years in the choice of
ship configuration, and the changes in the onboard medical
treatment facility (MTF)
.
But the evolution of any system, and the management of
change in that system, does not occur in a vacuum. It is the
author's contention that hospital ships are affected by
unique Technical, Political and Cultural (TPC) influences
that are expressed in the final choice of hospital ship
configuration and MTF configuration. Many times one of these
TPC influences is the dominant one, usually there are three
involved in a decision for change and are difficult to
separate
.
It is not enough to know that systems evolve and are
subject to TPC influences that affect changes made to the
system. Managers, particularly health care managers, have a
reason and need to know how to manage these TPC systems in a
system under construction, or in the end product being
deployed. One useful tool is Configuration Management (CM)
which is a DOD wide procedure for administering and
documenting changes to a system.
It is more than just a collection of manuals in contract
administration. CM, properly constructed, can serve as a
unique vehicle for managing the competing TPC systems in a
health care system and is especially appropriate for a
deployed hospital ship.
B. THE TECHNICAL, POLITICAL, CULTURAL (TPC) THEORY
The TPC Theory was formulated by Noel M. Tichy in his
book Managing Strategic Change - Technical, Political, and
Cultural Dynamics [Ref. 1] . The author of this thesis chose
this particular theory as a model to categorize the various
pressures within the 1980' s hospital ship project for two
reasons. The first reason is the TPC Theory was derived
directly from Tichy' s involvement in various health care
systems in the United States. Second is the author's belief
that the TPC Model will have an intuitive appeal to the
working health care manager, and layman, alike.
The model's foundation is composed of three distinct yet
interrelated and interdependent [Ref. l:p. 10] change
management foci in a health care endeavor such as the
hospital ship project: (1) the technical aspects of work,
(2) power, and (3) values. Tichy uses the analogy of the
strands of a 'strategic rope' [Ref. l:p. 11] where the
comparable strands match the foci in the technical strand,
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political strand and cultural strand. Tichy states in his
preface that:
It should be made clear that TPC theory is not a formal
theory. It is a meta-theory , a framework for working
with organizational problems, . . . it is, hopefully, a
pragmatic tool as well as a conceptual framework for
conducting research and building a body of knowledge in
the field of change. Theories are intellectual tools for
organizing data in such a way that one can make
inferences on logical transitions from one set of data to
another; they serve as guides to the investigation,
explanation, organization, and discovery of matters of
observable fact (Deutsch and Krauss ) . Even though TPC
theory generally meets these criteria, it is not explicit
enough about its assumptions, the mode of logical
inference and the empirical referents are not worked out;
and there is no ability to unambiguously test the
theory's implications. As a theoretical orientation,
however, I hope it will stimulate work that will move it
from a meta-theory to a more formal theory. [Ref. l:p.
9]
The above quote points out some of the strengths as well
as weaknesses of the TPC theory. It not only provides a
theoretical orientation for this thesis but it also provides
a framework to categorize the Technical, Political and
Cultural pressures throughout the life history of the
hospital ship project. The TPC theory aids in tracing the
evolution of hospital ship configurations, American and
foreign, past and present, by categorizing all pressures and
configuration changes into one of three areas.
The practicing health care manager will gain a new
awareness of how organizational processes work through and
around him or her by identifying the TPC influences. Perhaps
the single greatest benefit of the orientation the TPC theory
provides is in the area of change management. The day to day
11
manager will become aware that no change in any of these
areas will be successful unless the other two systems are
considered. Tichy's book provides a multitude of practical
change mechanisms all of which are beyond athe scope of this
thesis. Common to all these mechanisms and of interest to
the pragmatic health care manager, is the first step - one
must correctly identify and categorize the influences and
associated changes into one of the three TPC systems before
change management can occur.
Later in this thesis the role of configuration management
is explored as a practical change mechanism for the pragmatic
manager to utilize. It is not mentioned in Tichy's book, and
most of the current literature on Configuration Management
(CM) focuses on the clerical, administrative and technical
aspects of Configuration Management documentation. It is the
author's view that the Configuration Management procedures
and philosophy can be successfully merged with the TPC theory
to provide a useful change mechanism within the confines of
Department of Defense regulations.
C. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
This thesis strives to reach a number of research
objectives. Each objective is judged equally important by
the author because there is a need for information in each




1. To provide a concise history of the U. S. Navy's
Hospital Ship Program, from the needs assessments
of the late 1970' s to project completion of two
hospital ships in 1986 and 1987.
2. To trace and compare the evolution of American
hospital ship configuration from the Civil War to
the present
.
3. To compare present-day hospital ship/clinic ship
configurations in the international community.
4. To outline the Technical, Political and Cultural
Theory (TPC) as a model to categorize the various
internal and external pressures present in the
1980's hospital ship project.
5. To survey the field of Configuration Management
and its methodology as a unique vehicle for
communicating and balancing the TPC influences
among interested parties.
6. To categorize the concrete configuration changes
of the USNS Mercy and USNS Comfort in terms of
Configuration Management documentation, and the
associated dollar cost of these changes.
7. To draw conclusions and recommendations from the
roles of Configuration Management and the TPC
model in present and future construction of
hospital ships.
8. To provide a bibliography of references on
hospital ships and configuration management.
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This research effort consisted of two separate
approaches: (1) on-site visits to the Hospital Ship Project
Manager Office, Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D. C.
and the Supervisor of Shipbuilding ( SUPSHIP) /USNS COMFORT
Cadre Crew Office, San Diego. Extensive personal interviews
and research through office documents were conducted; and (2)
extensive literature searches through the standard and
13
military indexes as well as computer searches through DTIC,
MEDLARS/MEDLINE and ARLEN
.
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The scope of the thesis in regards to hospital ships is
limited to those floating platforms which have as their
primary mission the provision of some type of health care.
The scope of the thesis in researching the field of
configuration management was limited to those aspects of CM
which are the approval mechanisms and processes which manage
change. The thesis does not address the intricate technical
and administrative details of CM processes, accounting audits
and procedures for documenting CM changes.
Limitations in the research interviews primarily involve
the reluctance of civilian and military personnel to 'speak
on the record' concerning specific changes made in the 1980'
s
hospital ship project and what specific technical, political
or cultural influence was the impetus for the implemented
change. The literature search on the general topic of
hospital ships was primarily hampered by the lack of time to
obtain them. The topic has not been written about
extensively. Many articles are in overseas journals and only
in a foreign language. Domestic sources of literative
searches were limited by computerized data bases going back
only as far as the late 1960's. Manual indexes and
14
college/university libraries within reasonable commuting
distance of the Monterey Peninsula were also utilized.
F. THESIS CHAPTER SUMMARY
The first chapter briefly introduces the reader to the
hospital ship concept, the Technical, Political, Cultural
Theory, the nature of change and evolution in hospital ships,
the nature of configuration management as a change mechanism,
and the cost aspect of all implemented changes.
In Chapter II the author traces the evolution of hospital
ship configuration with commentary on the TPC influences in
each time period. Historical summaries are kept to a
minimum.
Present day international hospital ship configurations
and onboard medical treatment facility configurations are
covered in Chapter III. Historical summaries are kept to a
minimum and TPC influences are also commented on when
appropriate
.
The history and evolution of the 1980' s hospital ship
program is discussed in Chapter IV. A detailed history of
the project complete with TPC influences is given from
project initiation through deployment of the USNS MERCY .
Configuration Management (CM) is covered in Chapter V.
Several definitions, the role of CM in the hospital ship
project and specific examples of documented CM changes are
15
given. The CM process as a TPC integrating mechanism is also
discussed
.
Chapter VI presents the author's summary and conclusions
and makes some recommendations for future consideration.
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II. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF UNI TED STATES HOSPITAL SHIPS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will trace the evolution of American
hospital ship configurations, and onboard medical treatment
facility configurations throughout United States history.
Where possible the various technical, political and cultural
influences of the specific time period will be commented on,
along with their effect on the particular hospital ship under
construction.
B. PRE-CIVIL WAR
There were no American hospital ships prior to 1860.
There was a tradition of Spanish, French and British hospital
ships dating back to the Spanish Armada fleet (1587-1588)
which included fifteen galleons designated to carry only the
sick and wounded. In the innumerable wars between these
three great European seapowers , there were designated sailing
ships, of various configurations and minimal medical




The Americans may have used sailing vessels primarily for
carrying sick and wounded men but none have been recorded.
During the War of 1812 a British hospital ship, the HMHS
GORGEN accompanied the British expedition to the United
17
States. No details were available [Ref. 2:p. 16] on the ship
configuration or medical treatment facilities.
C. CIVIL WAR, 1860-1865
The American use of hospital ships began with floating
barges that served as make-shift hospitals near battles
fought by large inland rivers. In 1862 the Union army
captured a large Mississippi river side-wheeler from the
Confederates at New Orleans. In that same year the steam
propelled, wooden ship was transferred to the Western Gunboat
Flotilla and was commissioned the RED ROVER on December 26,
1862. The ship weighed 786 tons and had holds that could
carry three hundred tons of ice and two month's supply of
food and medical needs. The ship's crew complement was
twelve officers and thirty-five enlisted personnel. The
medical treatment facility included seventy medical
personnel--doctors and orderlies. One quote described her:
as the most capable thing of its kind ever floated . . .
qauze blinds at the windows to keep the cinders and smoke
from annoying the sick . . . two water closets on every
deck, an elevator and special amputating rooms. [Ref.
3 :p. 16]
The RED ROVER could treat up to two hundred patients at a
time
.
D. SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR, 1898-1899
The (first) USS RELIEF was used by the United States Army
as a floating ambulance. The ship's medical treatment
facility had 195 beds. The technical medical innovations of
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that time: "included a 30-cot , insect-proof isolation ward
and two padded cells." [Ref. 3:p. 18]
The other hospital ship used during this war was the USS
SOLACE (AH-2). The ship configuration was that of a 377 foot
passenger steamer. After the war the ship's configuration
was modified in 1909 at Charleston, SC . As stated in one
source [Ref. 3 :p. 17] at Charleston the superstructure was
enlarged, but then SOLACE tended to roll too much to carry
patients comfortably. To counteract this, the superstructure
height was reduced and, according to one account, 200 Civil
War cannon were embedded in concrete in the hull, making
SOLACE , a hospital ship, the most heavily gunned (ship) in
the Navy. This might be thought amusing until one remembers
that both the USNS MERCY and COMFORT have water ballast in
their holds making up almost half of the ship's weight. It
has been said by the crew of the MERCY that if the ship were
torpedoed, (15 allied hospital ships were in World War I)
more water would flow out than would flow in.
One interesting note on the medical treatment facility
configuration of the SOLACE is that she was the first U. S.
Navy ship to fly the Red Cross flag, a "cultural" influence.
E. WORLD WAR I, 1914-1918
Three American hospital ships were used after World War
I. They were the USS COMFORT (AH-3), USS MERCY (AH-4) and
USS SOLACE (AH-5). The ships were small, steam powered
19
passenger liners. The medical treatment facility had 250
beds in each ship. The political and cultural influences of
that time period were such that: "hospital ships had been
viewed essentially as transports for casualties, converted
liners or cargo ships designed to get the wounded out of the
combat zone and back to a hospital ashore" [Ref. 3:p. 18]
F. POST-WWI/PRE-WWII, 1918-1940
The first U. S. Navy ship originally designed and built
as a hospital ship was the (second) USS RELIEF (AH-1). She
was commissioned on December 28, 1920, served through the
inter-war period, and all through World War II. The RELIEF
was 438 feet long and weighed 10,112 tons. She was
considered the most sophisticated Navy medical facility
afloat. The medical treatment facility configuration
included 44 medical officer, 331 corpsmen and space for 500
patients. The ship "... offered all the facilities of a
shore-based hospital, including specialists in different
branches of medicine" [Ref. 3:p. 19]
The political influence of the time was such that
additional hospital ships were not built. Technical
influences took a backseat during this time period.
One critic wrote in favor of building hospital ships from
the keel up, rather than converting existing vessels,
Above all other things, the fleet hospital ship should be
a vessel designed and built for that specific purpose. . .
a house or a factory on shore, made over into a hospital,
20
would by no means be expected to approach the ideal. [Ref.
3 :p. 18]
Johnson (R. ADM . . . MC ) made several recommendations to
improve hospital ship constructions. Among them: that the
ships displace about 10,000 tons:
a convenient size, large enough to house a hospital, yet
small enough to navigate in cramped harbors; that they
are fast enough steam with battle groups; and that they
be able to darken ship without detracting from the care
given to patients. [Ref. 3:p. 19]
It is interesting to note the TPC conflict between those
who wish to build new construction hospital ships from the
keel up, and those who wish to convert existing vessels.
Usually the political influence has 'won out' due to emergent
needs of armed conflict. But even in the 1980 's hospital
ship project this conflict was reflected in various studies
on the need for new hospital ships, and reflected in the
Request for Proposals ( RFP ' s ) submitted by potential hospital
ship offerors. The final result of the TPC dilemma was a
compromise— large supertanker hulls almost completely gutted,
and then rebuilt in a hospital ship configuration.
G. WORLD WAR II, 1941-1945
There were twelve American hospital ships used during
World War II. The USS RELIEF (AH-1) has already been
described. (The USS SOLACE (AH-2), USS COMFORT (AK-3) and
USS MERCY (AH-4) were decommissioned during the inter-war
period and although these ship names were used again— the
original ships were not)
.
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The (second) USS SOLACE (AH-5) was an 8,900-ton converted
passenger liner. She was commissioned August 9, 1941 and
treated casualties during the Pearl Harbor attack. The
(second) USS COMFORT (AH-6) and the (second) USS MERCY (AH-8)
were also converted passenger liners. Both were commissioned
in the summer of 1944. No information was found on the USS
HOPE (AH-7) as to ship configuration.
The US S BOUNTIFUL (AH-9) ship configuration was that of a
World War I marine transport that was converted, and then
commissioned as a hospital ship on March 23, 1944. The USS
SAMARITAN (AH-10) ship configuration was initially a military
transport ship (the USS CHAUMONT ) before commissioned as a
hospital ship on May 24, 1944.
More information than usual was available on the USS
REFUGE (AH-11). Her basic ship configuration was also that
of a military transport (the USS KENMORE ) She was 544 feet
long and had 14,000 tons displacement. The following quote
is typical of hospital ships converted from military
transports
:
One significant construction (or conversion feature) was
the building of cargo ports (for embarking and debarking
patients) on each side of the second deck opposite the
elevator, with a lobby connecting the cargo ports with
the elevator and with the passageways to the wards. This
facilitated patient loading since half the hospital beds
were on the second deck and the elevator was required
only for the litter patients on the third deck and in
Sick Officers Quarters. The conversion process also
involved extensive repairs of decks, laundry spaces, and
other areas to meet medical needs. This was accomplished
at the Maryland Dry Dock Company shipyard in Baltimore.
A patch-work job of conversion first proposed was finally
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replaced by a thorough rebuilding of the ship. An
Optical Lens Unit was installed and several motor launch
life boats and life rafts; comprehensive equipment for a
first class hospital was obtained and placed aboard the
converted vessel. With Red Cross help, large quantities
of surgical dressings were procured. [Ref. 4: pp. 38-39]
The medical treatment facility configuration aboard these
ships was 630 beds with a 72 cot mobile field hospital. The
medical personnel consisted of 29 medical officers, 27 Navy
nurses and "many" hospital corpsmen.
The last of the 'early' World War II hospital ships was
the USS RESCUE (AH-18). Her ship configuration was of a
passenger liner before converted and commissioned as a
hospital ship on May 7, 1941. Her medical treatment facility
configuration was initially that of an ambulance transport
for dock loading only. Later she was equipped with an
electric hoist for litter patients. The MTF bed capacity was
776 beds. The medical complement was 11 medical, 1 dental
and 4 hospital corps officers, 25 nurses and 164 enlisted
corpsmen.
H. POST WORLD WAR II, KOREAN WAR AND VIETNAM WAR 1945-1976
The last six hospital ships that served from 1945, to the
last one decommissioned in 1976, were "Haven" class hospital
ships. The basic ship configuration was 520 feet by 71.5
feet by 22 feet. The displacement in tons was 11,141
standard and 15,500 full load. The main engines were General
Electric steam turbines with 1 shaft of 1,000 shaft horse
power and 18 knots speed. [Ref. 5: p. 761]
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The hospital ships in this class were:
USS HAVEN (AH-12) - Commissioned May 5, 1945
USS BENEVOLENCE (AH-13) - Commissioned May 18, 1945
USS TRANQUILITY (AH-14) - Commissioned April 24, 1945
USS CONSOLATION (AH-15) - Commissioned May 22, 1945
USS REPOSE (AH-16) - Commissioned June 2, 1945
USS SANCTUARY (AH- 17 Commissioned June 20, 1945
Each ship had a complete hospital with operating rooms,
wards and ancillary services. Each ship's crew complement
had 67 officers and 420 enlisted men. The MTF personnel was
composed of 45 officers and 120 enlisted men The USS
CONSOLATION (AH-15), the USS REPOSE (AH-16) and the USS HAVEN
(AH-12) were used during the Korean War The TPC system
during the Korean War is evident in the following excerpt:
All three ships were anchored offshore at Inchon for a
considerable period of time and used as floating base
hospitals. Together they provided complete, definitive,
surgical and medical care and approximately 2,500 beds
for combat troops within a relatively short distance from
the battlelines. This close support was possible because
the United Nations forces controlled the sea and airways.
Such close support had not been possible during most of
World War II owing to the danger of enemy air or naval
attack. After the fighting in northern Korea became
heavy, the hospital ships served mostly on the east coast
of Korea as floating hospitals and to take casualties to
Japan. The most important event at that time was the
development and installation of helicopter landing
platforms on the sterns of the ships. This enabled the
helicopter ambulance to pick up wounded men from near the
battlelines and deposit them aboard a modern floating
hospital almost within sight and sound of enemy guns,
sometimes in less than 20-30 minutes. For the first time
in the history of warfare battle casualties could receive
definitive medical and surgical care in a matter of
minutes after being stricken. The hospital ship with the
landing platform, first suggested in the battle area by
24
Vice Admiral Joel T. Boone, MC , USN made this possible.
[Ref. 4:p. 431]
During the Vietnam War the USS REPOSE (AH-16) and the USS
SANCTUARY (AH-17) were used in much the same manner as
expressed in the above excerpt . Both these ships were
decommissioned near the end of the war. There were no active
duty hospital ships until the USNS MERCY (T-AH-14) and USNS
COMFORT (T-AH-20) were constructed in the late 1980 's.
Appendix A lists the specific ship configurations and medical
treatment facility configurations of these two ships. A
photograph and drawings are also provided of these ships. A
specific history of these ships, along with their TPC
influences, is provided in Chapter IV.
I. PROJECT HOPE
One of the best known hospital ships, at least to the
American people, is the SS HOPE . In 1959 a non-profit
organization called the People to People Health Foundation
persuaded President Eisenhower to release from the "mothball
fleet" the USS CONSOLATION (AH-15)—one of the Haven Class
hospital ships used in World War II and the Korean War. The
following exerpt shows the TPC influences during the initial
outfitting of Project Hope:
The CONSOLATION will be a great floating hospital center-
-a medical school, a training and treatment center, a
base for medical, nursing, and sanitation teams, and the
logistic center for medical aid, health, and exchange
programs. It will be a tangible evidence of American
friendship and understanding. The great 800-bed hospital
was constructed during World War II and was service in
?5
that war and the Korean conflict. Its equipment includes
ample hospital beds, and space which can be used as class
and demonstration rooms, operating rooms, and
laboratories. It has quarters for the personnel and crew
needed to staff and operate the ship, and only some new
equipment from private sources is needed to make it
completely modern and able to provide a broad training
base. [Ref. 6:p. 414]
The medical treatment facility configuration of this type
of ship has already been described. The medical complement
described by one source is:
The permanent medical staff aboard will include 10
physicians, experts in various fields of medicine and
surgery, about 20 graduate nurses, technicians, and
practical nurses, and 10 to 15 epidemiologic,
nutrituional , sanitation, and public health mobile
groups. The remainder of personnel will be volunteer
units of specialists who will serve three-month tours.
They will be selected by a committee representing
American medical colleges. [Ref. 7:p. 28]
Project Hope sailed from 1959 to 1972, visiting over
fifteen different countries over that time period. The ship
was eventually scrapped as too cost inefficient and Project
Hope went to flying teams of medical specialists and supplies
to needed areas.
J. LIFE INTERNATIONAL
Life International is a non-profit organization
"dedicated to providing medical care and training and other
humanitarian services to the people of less developed
countries ( LDC ' s ) . [Ref. 8:p. 2]. The purpose of H. R. 406
is to amend Public Law 97-360 to extend the expiration date
for Life International to remove up to three ships from the
26
National Defense Reserve Fleet ( NDRF ) for conversion to
hospital ships along the lines of the SS_HOPE.
Among the candidates mentioned for conversion in this
legislation is the USS SANCTUARY (AH-17) which is still
"retained in the inactive fleet as a contingency until new
construction ships are completed." [Ref. 9:p. 6] This ship
is the surviving sister of the Haven Class hospital ships.
If reactivated she will be the last of the old style hospital
ships. The prospect for this appears doubtful due to the
inability of Life International to raise $100,000 a year,
much less the $10 million deeded to retrofit even one ship.
The bill passed the House of Representatives and was sent
to the U. S. Senate for consideration. Opponents of the bill
objected to the Federal Government providing two-thirds of
the retrofitting cost, others opposed it on deficit reduction
reasons, still others opposed it because they thought the
eventual goal of Life International was total funding of the
project
.
In on interesting turnabout in TPC influences the Project
Hope organization turned out to be a major opponent. The
various reasons Project Hope listed against the Life
International ship or ships are stated below:
1. The cost of repair and refitting of ships of this
vintage for the purpose outlined are beyond
reason. Inflation and age take a drastic toll.
If repaired and refitted, the maintenance and
constant repair required of ships of this age is
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2. If repaired and refitted, the maintenance and
constant repair required of ships of this age is
arbitrary. We know, we have been there. Spare
parts are lacking and frequently must be
fabricated adding to expense.
3. The cost of fuel—which is required in
considerable amount even in port, is still
arbitrarily expensive. Keep in mind, when we
last sailed the SS HOPE, fuel was only $1.80 per
barrel
.
4. Such vessels cannot be manned by volunteer crews.
Unemployment in the maritime industry is at an
all time high. American union seamen, although
the most efficient in the world, are also the
highest paid.
5. It is impossible to obtain authorization from the
Coast Guard for an American Flag Ship to be
cleared to go to sea without union seamen. This
is not a political problem but one of safety at
sea in the eyes of the Coast Guard.
6. Navigation and radar equipment required for
maritime vessels is far in excess of that
required for military ships. The expense of
these additions is significant, and must be kept
current as regulations change.
7. If these vessels have not been utilized in recent
years, just the installation of sewage disposal
systems as required by international and United
States law are an arbitrary expense. This
requirement cannot be waived.
8. Once such ships are utilized by a private
voluntary organization, each time they return to
the United States they must be recertified by the
Coast Guard. During all the years we sponsored
the SS HOPE , there was never an occasion that
regulations had not changed--and substantial
expenses encountered in the shipyard before
recertif ication was obtained. This does not even
address the normal maintenance and repairs
constantly required by an ocean going vessel.
9. During this time of budgetary crisis, the
national security of the United States will not
benefit in any way from such an activity. The
Executive Branch and the Congress are faced with
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difficult decisions on the establishment of
priorities. Indications that the budget of the
Agency for International Development will be
reduced by 10.6% this coming year is evidence of
the seriousness with which congress is looking at
expenditures for this type of activity. It would
seem to us that any action which would imply the
eventual use of such vessels with substantial
federal funding is remote." [Ref. 9:p. 53]
The cynical might also add that there is competition even
among charities. The TPC reasons against reactivating the
SANCTUARY or any other ship appear insurmountable. Federal
funding for such a purpose would be better spent on the USNS




There is one non-profit charitable organization that runs
two hospital ships on a continuous basis. A Christian
missionary organization. "Youth With A Mission" [Ref. 10]
has one full fledged hospital ship on the West Coast, and a
medical clinic ship on the East Coast. The Mercy Vessel
ANASTASIS is based on the West coast and has been in
operation since 1981. The ship makes frequent trips to
Mexico and has conducted a South Pacific cruise to Fiji,
Tanga , Samoa and New Zealand.
The ship configuration of M/V ANASTASIS is that of a
cargo passenger vessel built in 1953. She was purchased for
$4 million in 1978 by Mercy Ships to provide medical care and
Christian missionary activities to less developed countries.
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The ship is 522 feet long by 68 feet wide and is nine stories
tall. The vessel weighs 11,695 tons and is powered by an
8,000 horse power diesel engine. The medical treatment
facility configuration consists of a 30-bed hospital with one
general operating room, one eye operation/corrective surgery
room, laboratory, X-Ray room, dental clinic, dental
laboratory and pharmacy. The core medical staff is comprised
of two doctors, eight nurses, and a varied number of LPNs
.
Depending on the nature of a medical mission, a roster of 50-
60 specialists can be provided for any particular trip which
can last up to three months.
The other ship, the M/V SAMARITAN , is a medical clinic
ship based in Florida. The ship configuration is that of a
former yacht, 173 feet long by 38 feet wind and weighing
1,036 tons. It has refrigerated storage space of 2,500 cubic
feet. The ship's medical missions include trips to countries
in the Caribbean Basin and the Amazon River in Brazil.
In contrast to some of the TPC influences listed in the
preceding section these ships are much smaller operations
than those comtemplated by Life International. Also, the
ship's crew are all volunteers with the M/V ANASTASIS of
Maltese Registry and the M/V SAMARITAN of Panamanian
Registry.
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L. NEW YORK CITY'S FLOATING HOSPITAL
A 'hospital ship' on a much smaller scale than all of
those discussed before is found on the Hudson River in New
York City. The hospital ship is actually a floating medical
clinic for the indigent poor of New York City. The medical
clinic is a barge constructed to look like a small ship with
three decks. Its source of power is a tugboat and a long
towline
.
The group that operates the Floating Hospital is St.
John's Guild which is a private, non-profit and non-sectarian
organization. [Ref. 11 :p. 8]
The ship can carry over 800 patients for day trips up the
Hudson river. Over 2/3 of the patients are children. There
are 100 staff members including doctors, dentists, nurses and
physicians 's assistants in all the usual outpatient services.
M. SUMMARY
The concept of the hospital ship mission, as well as the
ship/MTF configuration, has changed over the years.
Initially this change was due to Cultural influences in
societies at large. Compassion for those wounded in action
evolved from simple transport to rudimentary medical care.
As the Technical influence of advancing medical technology
was achieved it was reflected in even more complex MTF
configurations. State of the art in ship building also
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advanced from the simple sailing ships of so many years ago,
to the modern supertanker/hospital ship platforms of today.
Political influences also played their part through the
years. Most of the time hospital ship conversions appeared
as an afterthought to armed conflict. Occasionally some
advanced preparation was made and a hospital ship was
constructed in advance of need. When a Political influence
was made known in the form of an armed conflict, the
available Technical and Cultural influences were reflected in
the available ship configurations, and available medical
technology of the time. This chapter has attempted to show
the evolution of these TPC influences as reflected in ship
and MTF configurations of the time.
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III. INTERNATIONAL 'HOSPITAL' SHIP/MEDICAL TREATMENT
FACILITY CONFIGURATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this chapter is to prevent a parochial
interest in only American hospital ships. Many countries,
friendly and otherwise, use hospital ships in their military
forces or in civilian uses. Although the available research
material was quite sketchy in this area the author will
present the data which was available on the various ship
configurations and onboard MTF configurations in current use.
The reader should gain an appreciation that TPC influences
are not uniquely American but affect the development and
utilization of hospital ships in many different cultures.
Another objective of this chapter is to indicate which
other countries have hospital ships, their configurations and
missions and to comment on some of the TPC influences that
may have affected their development. The last section of
this chapter details some of the unique TPC influences in the
British experience of converting civilian ships to hospital
ships
.
B. MICRONESIA/U. S. TRUST TERRITORY
One of the first areas of the world to be surveyed is
close to home in an administrative sense. The area of the
Pacific known as Micronesia is administered by the United
States under a United Nations mandate. This has been the
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situation since the end of World War II. Culturally the area
is a mix of Pacific island cultures and languages. Japanese
and English are the main unifying languages among the major
island groupings.
Politically the area has been ignored by the United
States, at least until recently. Minimal economic aid, and
minimal health care aid, has been the norm. The twin
pressures of Pacific island nationalism and Russian
encroachment have forced the United States to view the area
in a new perspective.
One expression of the interest has been strictly
altruistic. A private, non-profit organization called
Marimed provides health care and training to the people of
Micronesia. This area presents serious logistical problems
because Micronesia is composed of over 3100 islands spread
over 3000 miles.
The basic ship configuration used by Marimed are 150 foot
sail boats built at a cumulative total cost of $2.6 million.
The medical treatment facility configuration aboard each
sailing vessel consists of an X-Ray room, diagnostic
laboratory, and treatment rooms.
One article [Ref. 12:p. 52] states that:
Volunteer health educators, doctors, dentists, and nurses
will treat patients while training native healers,
midwives, and health assistants. Because the ships will
use sail propulsion at trade wind latitudes, they will
burn less than $100 per day in fuel--compared to the
$2800 per day now spent by motorized ship's bringing
supplies to the outer islands.
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Thus the geography of the area and (so far) low economic
support given to the area have dictated the configuration of
one of the more unique hospital ship platform configurations
in this chapter.
There is also a Cultural influence in the operation of
these sailing hospital ships. The islanders have a need to
be involved with the delivery of health care in their island
groups. Island and tribal centers of power can be disrupted
if the local health care professionals are not added to 'the
team '
.
The plan of operation is as follows:
Marimed's ships will circle the Marshall Islands and
other Micronesian territories, staying a week or two at
each atoll. In addition to going ashore to treat
patients and train local health care workers, Marimed
personnel will use the ships as "central switchboards"
that will be accessible to all of Micronesia.
Micronesian health care workers will call in symptoms and
receive instructions about treating patients via radio.
[Ref. 12:p. 53]
C. ASIA
Another area of the world of increasing United States
concern is Asia. Politically the United States has large
stakes in the area through bases in Korea, Japan and the
Philippines. Asia is also America's largest trading partner.
The Soviet Union continues its efforts to increase political
and military pressures in the area. Some of the Asian
countries appreciate this, other do not. The aforementioned
pressures have caused many of the Asian countries to escalate
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their military expenditures. Among these expenditures are
health care needs with a distinctly military bent. Those
Asian countries with the money have recognized their current
Political climate and are buying the latest Technical
capability in the hospital ship area.
According to one source [Ref. 13 :p. 71] an unnamed ASEAN
nation launched "a revolutionary new form of hospital ship"
in August 1985. The ship was deemed revolutionary because
the basic ship configuration was that of a modified Landing
Ship Tank (LST)
.
The Rapid Deployment Hospital Ship (RDHS) has more in
common with a Field Hospital than a conventional hospital
ship. Firstly, it will get closer to the action in a
battle or disaster area because of its configuration and
dual role as a transport vessel. Secondly, the LST can
approach an active area, perform its first level of
responsibility—whether it be unloading equipment or
troops--and then, in the space of about two hours, re-
emerge as a floating surgical and medical facility.
Finally, because this dual role will cause forfeiture of
protection under the Geneva Convention in times of
declared war, the RDHS will experience the same potential
for enemy attack as a Field Hospital unit on land.
The medical treatment facility consists of a series of
Medical, Ward, and Service modules to be stored on deck
during a combat support mission. The modules would then be
lowered into the ship and set into a hospital configuration
after all combat troops and supplies have been removed. The
concept is quite similar to the United States Naval Fleet
Hospital Support Program which builds modular land hospitals
of 250, 500 and 1000 bed hospitals to be prepositioned in
allied nations around the world.
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Some examples of Medical Container are Pathology
Laboratory and Blood Bank, X-Ray, Recovery and Operating
Theatre. Some examples of Service Modules are Generator,
Waste Treatment Plant, Incinerator, Desalinator, and
Morgue/Store. The article went on [Ref. 13:p. 72] to state
that: "the containers are lowered into the hold of the
ship . . . connected to the necessary plumbing and electrical
outlets. Within an hour or two, the ship will be prepared to
receive casualties."
The ships are modified by International Military Services
Limited (IMS), a United Kingdom company described as "wholly
owned by the British Ministry of Defense." IMS claims much
of its knowledge and experience from the Falklands War. It
converted the SS UGANDA, an educational cruise ship, into a
combat troop carrier and floating hospital. IMS also
converted the oceanographic survey ship HMS HYDIA, HEDA and
HERALD into sea-ambulance ships serving the UGANDA.
D. PHILIPPINES
Countries such as South Korea, Japan or Indonesia can
afford the technology offered in the preceding section--the
Philippines cannot. This nation recognizes the Political
influences in its part of the world but by history and trade
is tied both Politically and Culturally very closely to the
United States. Although the Philippines has had a long
relationship with the United States it remains a relatively
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poor country. The best this nation can do in the Technical
area is to buy a Vietnam War era 'hospital ship'.
There was a very short entry in Jane's Fight ing Ships
[Ref. 5:p. 417] on a 'hospital' ship in the Philippine Navy.
The ship is called the WESTERN SAMAR and it is an amphibious
ship type configuration built in the United States as an LSM-
1 class. The ship configuration characteristics are as
follows: displacement in tons: 743 beaching, 1,114 full
load, dimensions in feet" 203.5 X 34.5 X 7.5, guns: 1-40
mm(single) and 4-20 mm(single), main engines: 2 diesels, 2
shafts at 2,880 bhp = 12.9 knots, range in miles: 4,500 at
12.5 knots. There was little information on the medical
treatment facility configuration except that the ship's
complement was approximately 70 and that the "LP66 was fitted
as hospital ship (LSM-H) for treating casualties retaining
her armanent . Has deckhouses in and above well-deck."
Its interesting history is as follows:
WESTERN SAMAR (ex-Hat Giang, ex-LSM 9011, ex-USS LSM
355), number LP66, commissioned 24 December 1944. LP66
originally transferred from U. S. Navy to French Navy for
use in Indo China in January 1954; subsequently
transferred to South Vietnam in December 1955.
E. BRAZIL
This survey of international hospital ships now leaves
the Pacific and Asian areas for a look at South America. One
of the largest countries in South America has two types of
hospital ships, one military ship and one civilian use ship.
The Political influences in this region of the world are
almost as turbulent as those in Asia. The countries in this
area are extremely nationalistic, against outsiders as well
as each other. Thus it is not surprising to see a health
care Technical influence expressed as a military hospital
ship
.
Jane's Fighting Ships [Ref. 5:p. 61] lists one hospital
ship in the Brazilian Navy. It is named the CARLOS CHAGAS
and was built in Rio de Janeiro in 1984. The basic ship
configuration characteristics are as follows: dimensions in
feet: 154.2 X 26.9, displacement in tons: 500 full load,
main engines: 2 diesels, 2 shafts, 714 Horsepower, Range in
miles: 4,000 at 9 knots. The ship can carry a helicopter on
an aft platform. The medical treatment facility
configuration is composed of two sick bays, dental surgery,
laboratory, two clinics and an X-Ray center. The ship's
complement if four officers, six doctors and dentists,
twenty-one ratings and fifteen medical ratings.
The civilian hospital ship operating in Brazil has much
in common with the Marimed sailing ships operating in
Micronesia.
An unnamed nonprofit organization in Phoenix, Arizona
supports a 'hospital ship' on the Amazon River in the amount
of $250,000 a year. The ship configuration is that of a
former San Diego, CA harbor ferry, named the ESPERANEA, that
was brought to the Amazon in 1974. The article [Ref. 14 :p.
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53] did not detail the specifics of the configuration of the
medical treatment facility. It did state that the:
. . .
crew of volunteer doctors, dentists and nurses
provide most of the medical and dental care for 175,000
people who live along the river. Their deadly enemies
are diptheria, tetanus, measles, polio, tuberculosis and
typhoid fever, as well as less exotic but still crippling
afflictions like tooth decay.
The Political influence evident in the hospital ship
configuration is that the Brazilians remain suspicious of
United States intentions. They will accept health care
support that is low key and that does not stir up any of the
indigenous peoples in the area. Low key means a small vessel
with a limited staff and capabilities. Culture may also play
a part in ship configuration. South American cultures like
to rely on themselves and don't like handouts especially from
the North. These TPC influences all tend to keep the vessel
configuration limited.
F. ARGENTINA
The TPC influences attributed to Brazilians can also be
said to apply to another 'feisty' South American country--
Argentina. Argentina has long vied for leadership of the
South American continent against Chile and Brazil. It is
also an extremely nationalistic and territorial country as
shown with its frequent clashes with Chile and its recent war
with the United Kingdom. All these Political influences led
to the Technical development of military use hospital ships
converted from other vessels.
"0
Very little information was available in the current
literature on the three Argentinian vessels that were
designated hospital ships during the Falklands War. One was
an Antartic Support Ship named the ARA BAHIA PARAISO . The
actual ship configuration was not mentioned, and neither were
the details of the medical treatment facility configuration.
The one source [Ref. 15:p. 18] on this subject, stated:
The Argentine ship carried specialists in surgery,
trauma, intensive care and anaesthetics supported by
others in medicine, cardiology, ophthalmology and
dentistry, the complement was said to comprise of 25
medical officers and 50 male nurses with a potential
capacity for 250 patients.
TPC influences that develop hospital ships in a war time
scenario appear similar to American influences in the last
chapter, or British influences to be covered in the next
section. The Culture of health care afloat is the same-
treating the sick and wounded in accordance with the Geneva
Convention. Political trends are easily discernable in
watching a war develop while Technical influences are based
on each countries individual resources and ship
configurations available for short term conversion.
G. UNITED KINGDOM
British TPC influences are the most closely aligned with
the United States for obvious Cultural and historical
reasons. Technical and Political influences vary in detail
and time. The Political influences leading up to the
Falklands War were short term, a matter of months, before
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actual shooting started. The Political influences of poor
readiness and planning resulted in a lack of foresight in
having contingency hospital ships ready to deploy
—
quite
similar to TPC influences to be covered in the next chapter.
Technical influences again depend on a nation's state of
the art in ship building and health care technology—areas in
which the United Kingdom is a leader. The British lead the
world in converting a civilian ship into a hospital ship in
less than one week. An education cruise liner, the SS
UGANDA, provided the basic ship configuration for the
conversion process. The ship was in Alexandria, Egypt when
hostilities were declared and was quickly transported to a
Gibraltar shipyard. While undergoing conversion (which took
only 65 hours!) medical supplies were airlifted from London
to Gibraltar for the supply effort.
The cruise liner of 77,000 tons already came equipped
with berthing, messing, and rehabilitation (recreation)
areas. The ship also already had massive storage areas, and
a large sports deck was converted into a helicopter landing
pad able to land fully laden Sea King helicopters. Patient
ramps were constructed to provide access to the triage area,
fitting of a jackstay for replenishment at sea, provision of
extra power supplies and lighting to clinical areas, and the
addition of a satellite communications facility.
The medical treatment facility configuration consisted of
a 'Reception/Triage Area 1 with eight stations and individual
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oxygen supply, suction facility and resuscitation equipment
setups. The 'Main High Dependency Ward' was located beneath
the flight deck and provided 44 beds. This ward had quick
access to the triage area and the pharmacy. The 'Pharmacy'
was complete in all wartime requirements and had easy access
to the main ward and triage area. The hospital ship had one
large 'operating theatre' with three operating tables and
complete individual operating room setups. The 'X-Ray
Department 1 had two machines with full automatic developing
facilities. The 'Laboratory' was located in the former
cocktail bar and provided facilities for hematology,
biochemistry, limited bacteriology and crossmatching of
blood. The storage of blood was also accomplished here by
keeping the blood in "the cold drinks cabinets at a constant
4C." The 'Burns Unit,' which saw extensive use, was housed
in the cruise liner's 'hospital' and provided 20 beds. The
bed totals besides those already mentioned were 100 high
dependency beds, with the former student dormatories
providing accommodation for several hundred less seriously
wounded patients. The article concluded with a determination
that the United Kingdom prepare contingency plans "... for
the future use of hospital and ambulance ships, which have
again proved their place in modern warfare." [Ref. 16:p. 15]
The last sentence above is a bitter lesson learned for
the British and a warning to other countries including the
United States. The British have a set of TPC influences that
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resulted in a civilian 'hospital ship' that the United States
does not have--the oil drilling environment of the North Sea.
Construction of a hospital ship for this environment is not
as exciting as the preceding military story but is just as
necessary.
The Culture of oil drilling is a remote, isolated and
hazardous one--self reliance is regarded as a virtue. This
influence is reflected in a new type of hospital ship
configuration designed for the unique demands of the North
Sea. Political influences were not available, as in the
preceding sections, except at the most macro level. The
British government is closely tied to, and dependent on, a
continuous flow of oil (and dollars) from the North Sea.
Therefore any measures taken to protect the oil rigs and the
trained personnel who work on them has great government
support
.
A concrete expression of this Political and Technical
support is demonstrated by the development of a Disaster
Relief /Hospital Ship by SEDCO (South Eastern Drilling
Company) a British government owned company. The basic ship
configuration is that of a semi-submersible service vessel
[Ref. 17:p. 194] with:
. . . the idea of having a large service vessel which
would have the capability of providing routine
maintenance facilities as well as acting as a rescue and




The South Eastern Drilling Company (SEDCO) spent $40
million dollars constructing this "13,000 ton column
stabilized semi-submersible utility vessel."
The vessel has overall dimensions of 312 feet long by 249
feet wide with a main deck some 90 feet above sea level
of 234 feet long by 197 feet wide. They have a distinct
advantage over conventional hulls in that they are able
to operate more effectively in extreme weather conditions
and provide a more stable and more spacious base for
operation.
The vessel can maintain its position next to an oil rig in
even the roughest weather by a combination of conventional
propellers, anchors and thrusters.
The medical treatment facility onboard this vessel
consists of one large and fully equipped operating room, and
a patient ward of permanent and folding beds for a total of
18 beds. In an emergency more beds can be added since the
MTF has easy access to adjoining cabins in the vessel. The
MTF also has a protable X-Ray and developing facility and
laboratory facilities. Patient access is ambulatory, or by
litter, or by crane which can lower patients through an
access port directly into the hospital.
The medical treatment facility can also offer immediate
treatment for diving accidents with a saturation diving
complex that adjoins the hospital . This includes a diving
bell and an emergency compression unit for treating
decompression sickness. The vessel has a helicopter pad for
evacuation of the most critical patients, and a boat landing
area for calm weather.
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H. EUROPEAN FISHING FLEETS
TPC influences result in 'hospital ships' that travel
with the wide ranging European fishing fleets. Political and
Cultural forces demand that health care be provided to this
traditional European industry. Technical health care
capabilities afloat are limited and serious emergency cases
are airlifted to the nearest host country. Both West Germany
and Portugal use small ships for this health care function.
The Germans have a combined hospital ship/fishery
research vessel named the ANTON DOHUN that sails with this
country's international fishing fleet. The source [Ref.
18:pp. 4-5] described hospital ship operations very briefly
in the fishing grounds off Spitzbergen. The basic
configuration is of a large modified fishing trawler. The
medical treatment facility consists of: "a hospital with
eight cabins, and X-Ray and dental rooms, it has a well-
equipped operating and treatment room in which emergency
operations can be performed."
The Portuguese have a hospital ship named the GILEANNES
,
which serves their roving fishing fleet. The article [Ref.
19 :p. 40] did not give the basic configuration but described
it as a 'weather ship 1 . The medical treatment facility
consists of 74 beds but can accommodate up to 320 patients in
an emergency. The ship is equipped with one large operating
room and three X-Ray units. It has regular hospital wards as
well as an isolation section for patients with communicable
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diseases. The medical staff is composed of two surgeons and
three general practitioners. They work in concert with 40
male nurses stationed on fishing trawlers throughout the
fleet.
I. TUBERCULOSIS HOSPITAL SHIPS
TPC influences have resulted in another type of unique
hospital ship—one used exclusively by TB patients. Again,
there are strong Political and Cultural pressures to take
care of such afflicted patients. The Technical solution
depends on a country's resources and ships available for
construction or conversion. Two countries that have TB
hospital ships are the Netherlands and Canada.
The Dutch Red Cross for years had chartered passenger
liners, in the off season, for week long trips for long term
tuberculosis patients. With funding from Dutch trade
industry, and the National Emergency Fund, they built their
own hospital ship. The basic ship configuration is described
as a small cruise liner named the J^ HENRY DUNANT. The
reference [Ref. 20:p. 48] states:
. . . this new boat which will contain among other things
an examination, an isolation, and a sterilization
room . . . The National Emergency Fund has stipulated
that in case of emergency, the Jj__HENRY_DUNANT , must be
placed at the disposal of the government within 24 hours
because she is so constructed that she can be used either
as a hospital or as an evacuation ship - or even as a
center for assistance and help in a stricken area. This
latter use will be possible because the new ship will
have a capacity to provide meals for 200 persons.
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In Canada the basic ship configuration is that of a large
fishing trawler. The medical treatment facility onboard
provides TB diagnostic and preventive services. The ship,
the CHRISTMASSEAL, is run by the Newfoundland Tuberculosis
Association and serves 1,800 ports along 6,000 miles of
coast. The medical staff consists on doctors, nurses, X-Ray
technicians and rehabilitation officers from the regional
tuberculosis association. The source [Ref. 21 :p. 123] did
not go into detail about how many X-Ray machines were onboard
or any other details of the medical treatment facility.
J. USSR
No survey of current hospital ships would be complete
without mentioning the Russians! Unfortunately there was
little information available and TPC influences that are
inferred by the reader should be similar to any country that
has gone through an armed conflict and found its health care
capability to be lacking.
The Russians have two "0B" class hospital ships. One of
the ships is named the YENISEI, the other is the 0B. The
ship configuration characteristics as listed in Janets
Fighting Ships [Ref. 5: p. 623] are as follows: displacement
in tons: 11,000 full load, dimensions in feet: 498.7 X
20.3, aircraft: one Hormone helicopter with hanger, main
engines: 2 diesels, 2 shafts with 14,000 bhp = 20 knots,
range in miles: 20,000 at 18 knots. There was little
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information on the medical treatment facility configuration
except that each ship has up to 500 beds and has a ship's
complement of 85 plus a medical staff of 200. Jane's gives
the following short history:
Built at Szcuim, Poland. OB completed in 1980 and
transferred to the Pacific in September 1980. YENISEI
completed in 1981 . . . The first purpose—built hospital
ships in the Soviet Navy, a program which may have been
prompted by the use of several merchant ships off Angola
for Cuban casualties in the "war of liberation."
K. TPC ASPECTS OF HOSPITAL SHIP CONVERSION
In most of this chapter TPC influences have been
discussed from a macro approach--for the most part due to a
lack of research literature on hospital ships in foreign
countries. Political and Cultural influences leading up to
constructing or converting a hospital ship depend on each
unique situation. The British have provided some important
Technical influences to keep in mind when contemplating a
hospital ship.
One reference [Ref. 13:pp. 72-73] noted that the British
gained invaluable experience in short term conversion of
civilian ships into hospital ships during the Falklands War.
One individual was responsible for the design and overseeing
the conversion of the SSUGANDA from an educational cruise
ship to a floating hospital. This individual was Surgeon
Commander Roger J. Leicaster, Royal Navy, Consultant Surgeon
and Head of Surgery at the Royal Naval Hospital, Hasburg , U.
K.
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Any country using whatever type of ship and medical
facility configuration, the following excerpt on the most
important aspects to consider when a hospital ship conversion
is planned is most pertinent:
1. Keep it simple. It is not possible to recreate
the operating and medical care facilities
available in a land--based hospital. Recognize
this fact and be prepared for some different
arrangements of facilities.
2. The personnel are central to the success of the
unit. Wherever possible, the surgical and
nursing teams should be allowed to train and get
to know each other BEFORE they need to function
under battle or disaster conditions.
3. One hospital ship will probably not be enough,
particularly in island countries. In addition to
ambulance ships for transporting wounded to and
from the floating medical facility, more than one
hospital ship may be necessary. This is
particularly true in conditions where a utility
ship--such as an LST is used. Under surprise
conditions, such as natural disasters, the ship
may be several thousand miles away performing its
standard naval function. Unless a second ship is
closer and available for medical use, days of
precious time will be lost while the vessel is
being moved into the disaster areas.
4. Every detail of the ship must be known before the
conversion is attempted. One must make certain
the space available is suited for patient care,
and that movement of wounded and supplies is
possible in the areas defined.
5. Equipment must be able to withstand marine
conditions. For example, sterilizers and X-Ray
processing equipment must be able to function on
a ship rolling at sea. Many designs do not: a
few do.
6. Re-supply procedures must be preplanned in a
practical way and given priority.
7. Planners must remember that a flow of injured—on
and off the ship--is necessary. It is not enough
to plan how to get wounded men to the floating
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hospital. In order to provide room for treatment
of a maximum number of casualties, arrangements
must be made to move treated cases from the ship
as soon as it is safe to do so.
L. SUMMARY
This chapter has attempted to show the diversity and
inventiveness of foreign countries in meeting their wartime
and peacetime 'hospital ship 1 needs. TPC influences in such
cases can usually be viewed only from a macro perspective, as
opposed to a more micro approach used in discussing the
current American hospital ship program in the next chapter.
Cultural influences in each nation mean taking care of
wartime injuries and potential civilian casualties. This is
often translated into Political demands that a hospital ship
be built or converted from an existing vessel. This is
usually done on a last minute basis, particularly if a war is
imminent
.
Technical influences are not only determined by a
nation's industrial and health care capability, but also by
the use to which a hospital ship will be put. The design and
capability of a hospital ship in servicing a fishing fleet or
TB population is obviously going to be much different from a
hospital ship used in a war zone. In each of the examples in
this chapter survey there were unique Technical, Political
and Cultural influences at work. Each combination of TPC
influences resulted in the configuration of the hospital ship
achieved. The question of how well these TPC influences were
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managed and used in attaining the final configuration, can
only be answered by those individuals involved in each
nation's hospital ship project.
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IV. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE 1980' S HOSPITAL
SHIP PROGRAM
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will outline the history of the 1980'
s
hospital ship project, from project initiation to actual
deployment of a completed hospital ship. The purpose of this
chapter is to gain a microperspective of the role of TPC
influences in a hospital ship construction project. As
mentioned in the introduction, a health care manager must
first recognize TPC influences and their interrelationship
with one another. The manager can then take action to
utilize change mechanisms to manage the individual TPC
influences. Technical and Political influences are
frequently detailed but Cultural influences remain, for the
most part, unstated. This is due to the reluctance of
sources of information to discuss 'on the record' military
health care attitudes versus military shipbuilder attitudes
in the construction of the world's first 'supertanker'
hospital ships.
B. TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE HOSPITAL SHIP PROJECT
The technical influences in the hospital ship are perhaps
the most obvious. The TPC Model [Ref. l:p. 8] defines the
Technical system as a technical design problem where the:
Organization faces a production problem. Social and
technical resources must be arranged to produce desired
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output." The organization responsible for the construction
of the hospital ships is the Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEASYSCOM) . Tichy [Ref. l:p. 9] is speaking of an
organizational entity like the NAVSEASYSCOM when he writes:
All organizations face a production problem. That is, in
the context of environmental threats and opportunities,
social financial, and technical resources must be arranded
to produce some desired output.
There are many technical influences in the hospital ship
project which represent the varied agencies involved in the
construction
.
First of all is the conversion of two supertankers into
hospital ships—something which has never been done before.
Described briefly in Chapter Four are the innovative methods
of reconstructing the ship, particularly the medical
treatment facility. The major technical 'players' in the
project are the National Steel and Shipbuilding Company
(NASSCO), Supervisor of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP) San Diego,
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEASYSCOM), Military Sealift
command (MSC), Naval Medical Command (NAVMEDCOM), and the
Surgeon General of the Navy. The last two agencies are the
primary Technical input for the medical equipment and the
design of medical spaces within the medical treatment
facility.
Other technical influences come on line during the
testing and inspection phases of the project. Most notable
is the Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) in conducting
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their inspection. There are some competing technical
influences from the American Bureau of Shipping Standards,
and United States Coast Guard Standards which were primarily
used in building the two hospital ships. The Ships Parts
Control Center, PA, provided technical input, particularly on
the logistics side of the project. Additional Technical
input was provided by the Navy Medical Material Support
Command, particularly in regard to the purchase of medical
equipment
.
C. POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE HOSPITAL SHIP PROJECT
In addition to those agencies mentioned in the preceding
section, other interested parties were: the White House, U.
S. Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for
Health Affairs, Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary of
the Navy, the Defense Secretary, the media, and the general
public. Many of the agencies in this section exerted
political influence of varying degrees when the decision was
reached to send the USNS MERCY to the Philippines.
Tichy states:
All organizations face the problem of allocating power
and resources. The uses to which the organization will
be put, as well as who will reap the benefits of the
organization, must be determined. Decisions around these
issues get reflected in . . . budget decisions, and the
internal power structure of the organization. [Ref. l:p.
10]
One of the mixed blessings of the hospital ship project
has been the high visibility and 'command attention' from
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numerous flag officers and high ranking civilians. This has
most often manifested itself in extensive media campaigns and
frequent tours by flag officers/civilians representing the
aforementioned agencies as well as flag officers from the
1 line Navy. '
In this area of influence, the political pressure for a
specific configuration change may be easily identified but
[Ref. l:p. 10] "the concepts and language are less formal and
often less obvious." Many political observations were made
to the researcher but most 'were off the record. 1 In every
case of configuration change there was at least a superficial
Technical reason to justify it. The trick for a health care
manager in a construction scenario is to first identify the
Political influence, and then try to mitigate or manage the
Political pressure to the 'best' advantage for the project.
D. CULTURAL ASPECTS OF THE HOSPITAL SHIP PROJECT
There are also many unique cultural influences in the
hospital ship project, particularly in the military culture
and medical culture influences. What is a Cultural
influence? Tichy states [Ref. l:p. 10]:
Organizations are in part held together by a normative
glue that is called culture. Culture consists of the
values, objectives, beliefs, and interpretations shared
by organizational members. One of the most important and
most difficult tasks of top management is to decide the
content of the organization's culture, that is, to
determine what values should be shared, what objectives
are worth striving for, what beliefs the employees should
be committed to, and what interpretations of past events
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and current pronouncements would be most
beneficial . . .
This aspect of the TPC model may be the most foreign to
the reader but it has had an effect on the evolution of the
hospital ship configuration and in the continuing
configuration control effort. The deployed hospital ship
will have a mix of military, medical and civilian cultures
aboard it. The hospital ships were built by a civilian
shipyard while the contract was administered by a military
agency. The deployed hospital ship, USNS_MERCY, was crewed
and captained by civilians of the Military Sealift Command,
her medical contingent was a tri-service DOD and Public
Health Service effort, her funding came from OPNAV while her
operational control was under the Pacific military command
structure
.
Speaking in generalities, American's have a love for the
biggest and the brighest of anything in the world. Although
all the initial design initiatives were big ships, it is
ironic that a supertanker was selected for the hospital ship
conversion which resulted in the largest hospital ships in
the world. The medical culture manifests itself in the
desire to have the 'latest' technology onboard, also usually
the largest and most expensive equipment available. The
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decision to add CAT scanners to the hospital ships so late in
the contracting process could be interpreted as another
manifestation of the cultural aspect of the TPC model.
Military culture is perhaps best demonstrated by the Board of
Inspection & Survey with their emphasis on Military Standards
during their inspection— on a ship built primarily to
American Bureau of Shipping Standards, and U. S. Coast Guard
and Military Sealift Command standards.
E. PROJECT INITIATION TPC INFLUENCES
Hospital ships have been used in one form or another so
nothing is new about the overall concept. With one exception
(the USS RELIEF in 1920) all hospital ships in the past have
been converted from liners, freighters and troop transports
[Ref. 22:p. 32]. With the decommissioning of the last
Vietnam-era hospital ship in 1974 (USS REPOSE) the United
States had no dedicated hospital ship capability in existence
until the USNS MERCY sailed for the Philippines on 27
February 1987.
In the late 1970 's the U. S. Marine Corps determined that
"a significant deficiency exists in medical support for
amphibious operations" [Ref. 23: p. 11]. To determine the
magnitude of this need a study was commissioned by the Chief
of Naval Operations and conducted by the Naval Medical
Command. This study evaluated all alternatives to dedicated
hospital ships.
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criteria, select one or more alternatives to overcome earlier
identified medical deficiences. Ten years later, the same
deficiences exist according to an internal Department of
Defense study prepared in June 1984 [Ref. 23:p. 22]. That
study found the readiness of existing medical units (in the
Pacific Command) is low and that "the medical assets
designated for the Pacific could not be activated in time to
meet wartime needs."
On February 1979 the following alternatives were offered
for consideration by the U. S. Navy and U. S. Marine Corps as
illustrated in Table 1.
TABLE_1
ALTERNATIVE ONE: New Construction Commercial Ship (NCCS)
Type of Ship - Container capable
Relocatable structures capable
Modular capable
Method of Acquisition - Subsidy
Build and charter
Ownership - Commercial with contingency guarantees
ALTERNATIVE TWO: Dry Cargo Ship (DCS)
Type of Ship - Existing - container ship
- RO/RO (Roll-On/Roll-Off)
Barge Carrier
LASH (Lighter aboard ship)




Method of Acquisition - Lease
Ownership - Commercial
ALTERNATIVE THREE: Passenger Ship (PS)
Type of Ship - Inactive Passenger Ship
Inactive Passenger/Cargo Ship (Ferry)
Method of Acquisition - Lease
Ownership - Commercial
ALTERNATIVE FOUR: U. S. NAVY SHIP ( USNS
)





Method of Acquisition - Existing
Ownership - Navy
[Ref. 22:p. c-4]
Among the final recommendations of the ADHOS four hundred
page study was: 1) designating the Chief of Naval Operations
as sponsor of a hospital ship project. 2) designating the
aircraft carrier (training) or one or more dry cargo ships as
hospital ships during wartime and 3) utilizing the SS_UNITED
STATES , a laid up civilian passenger liner, as a rapid
deployment hospital ship. It is interesting to note that
Technical influences can change so rapidly that supertankers
were not considered as possible hospital ship platforms less
than ten years ago.
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F. POLITICAL INFLUENCES
According to the project manager [Ref. 24] for the
hospital ship program, the initial contract process began in
September 1980. The Department of Defense directed the Navy
to develop a budget estimate and a schedule to convert the
passenger ship SS UNITED STATES to a two thousand bed
hospital ship.
This alternative is important because it sets the
financial baseline for the present hospital ship program.
DOD Secretary Brown next submitted a figure of $450 million
in an amended program decision memorandum (PDM) through the
Office of Management and Budget for the fiscal year 1983
budget. A few months later OPNAV tasked NAVSEA to develop
alternatives to the SS UNITED STATES. It is revealed in
another reference [Ref. 25 :p. 1] that the political push for
the passenger ship was actually coming from then Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, Dr. John H. Moxley.
He advocated this vessel because: "it is the only ship found
so far which can provide the stated requirement for beds and
operating rooms at a reasonable cost and within a reasonable
time frame."
There were many different opinions about the project from
the very beginning. The Defense Resources Board (DRB) wanted
to support the newly formed Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) as
quickly as possible but had no objections to examining other
alternatives. The Navy Surgeon General at the time, Vice
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Admiral J. William Cox, wanted to utilize the USS SANCTUARY,
at that time a dependent support vessel docked in
Philadelphia. Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger, said
he wanted to have a hospital "ready to go in 1984." OPNAV
opposed both the SS UNITEDSTATES and USS REPOSE alternatives
on grounds of inadequacy in "stated requirements for beds and




Another reference [Ref. 25:p. 5] also mentioned
controversy on the financial end of the project. DOD tried
to move up the funding from fiscal year 1983 to 1982. In
considering the budget request for DOD the Senate deleted
funds for converting a hospital ship while the House voted to
provide the money. The Deputy Defense Secretary, Frank C.
Carlucci, lobbied the House/Senate conference committee and
eventually got the funds restored.
In January 1981 the Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
Shipbuilding and Logistics (ASN (S&L)) directed that NAVSEA
"lobby" the private sector to develop alternatives. This
first request for proposal (RFP) spelled out the RDF
requirements for medical support. [Ref. 26]
Potential contractors submitted "rough form" proposals
due to lack of detailed specifications from the Navy and the
short time (5 months) they had to prepare [Ref. 26]. In June
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1981 OPNAV Code 04 completed a preliminary review of NAVSEA
proposed alternatives based on the preliminary proposals made
by private industry. OPNAV 04 determined that the proposed
alternatives were not necessarily better than conversion of
the SS UNITED STATES.
In July 1981 [Ref. 26] OPNAV again tasked the Military
Sealift Command (MSC) to solicit proposals from industry.
This decision was made because industry was proposing to
convert/build and charter. At this time the first (of four)
Circular Of Requirements (COR) was published. A COR lists
all medical and technical requirements needed for the
hospital ship. This was a joint effort between the NAVSEA 03
medical liaison officer and the Surface Medicine Code of the
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (now called COMNAVMEDCOM) . In
August this COR was approved by OPNAV 04 and released to
industry as part of the MSC RFP process.
In September 1981 another 'twist' occurred in the
contracting process. OPNAV redirected management of the
hospital ship program to NAVSEA. It was not clear from an
interview with the hospital ship project manager [Ref. 26]
why the occurred. NAVSEA notified the industry of the new
'management change 1 , conducted an industry briefing and
issued an amendment to the original RFP issued by the MSC.
In December 1981 the preliminary industry data was
received and submitted to a NAVSEA Ship Acquisition
Improvement Panel (SAIP) decision process. The SS UNITED
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STATES was still under consideration at this point. The
Deputy Secretary of Defense reviewed the results of the SAIP
and decided on a construction or conversion of a "new"
hospital ship instead of the SS UNI TED_STATES . This office
also set the program procurement cost at $560 million.
H. TPC INTEGRATING MECHANISMS
Integrating mechanisms [Ref. l:p. 212]:
represent the means by which the organization achieves
coordination and control over its tasks and people. The
mechanisms vary in their capacity to process information,
and in how simple, how complex, and how costly their use
may be." . . . "There is a considerable range of
integrating mechanisms. The technical organizational
design problem is to match low uncertainty with simple
and cheap mechanistic integration devices and to save the
expensive, complex devices for those situations with high
uncertainty. Complex devices are appropriate when there
are high information-processing requirements and complex
interdependence
.
Configuration Management (CM) contains most of the
integration mechanism mentioned by Tichy [Ref. l:p. 213].
Tichy uses John Galbraith's "categorization scheme for
integrating mechanisms" proposed in his 1973 book Designing
Compl ex_0rgani za t ions . CM in it's most basic administrative
procedures contains the simple integration mechanisms of
rules and programs, hiearchy of authority and goal setting
and planning. CM is weaker on integration devices which
decrease the need for information processing. One of the
purposes of CM is to communicate and process large amounts of
information. The management structure of the Naval Sea
Systems Command and its shipbuilding proxy, the Supervisor of
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Shipbuilding-San Diego, provides for the creation of these
self-contained subunits. The Medical Liaison Officer and his
department are a prime example of this.
The Naval Sea Systems Command utilizes complex
integration mechanisms such as vertical information systems
and lateral relations. This is again done through CM
procedures to increase information-processing capacity and to
force communication between the government (NAVSEA) and the
prime contractor (NASSCO). Most of the lateral relations
used to decentralize the decision making load are used in CM
procedures at the SUPSHIP-San Diego level. Examples are
direct contact (sea trials), liaison roles (Medical Liaison
Officer), task forces (Military Sealift Command), teams
(special NAVSEA management and engineering teams) and
occasionally a modified matrix approach. The matrix is more
often found in higher level NAVSEA management structures than
in frontline shipbuilding organizations.
In January 1982 NAVSEA began 'Phase I' of their source
selection process. The source selection organization
consisted of fifty-eight members headed by NAVSEA Code 91 as
the source selection authority. There were three primary
teams within this organization:
1. The Definitive Care Facility Evaluation Team
which consisted of ten members from COMNAVMEDCOM.
2. A Ship Characteristics Evaluation Team composed
of fifteen engineers form NAVSEA and MSC and,
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3. A Schedule/Management Evaluation Team with seven
NAVSEA management specialists.
The first team represents a panel of experts from the
Naval Medical Command who provide detailed technical advice
on all medical spaces aboard the hospital ship. The second
team consists of the Navy's shipbuilding experts from the
Military Sealift Command and the Naval Sea Systems Command.
They design and engineer the entire hospital ship including
the main parameters of the medical treatment facility. The
third team schedules the actual construction of the hospital
ship and monitors the schedule through the Supervisor of
Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP) San Diego. The management specialists
can also act to resolve any disputes between the first two
teams
.
These various teams in turn reported to the NAVSEA
Contract Award Review panel (CARP) which consisted of six
members including the NAVSEA medical liaison officer. This
panel had the responsibility to coordinate and evaluate the
reports from these three teams and separate Cost Evaluation
Team. The CARP ' s findings were then presented to a Source
Selection Review Board which consisted of seven senior
personnel from OPNAV, COMNAVMEDCOM, NAVMAT , MSC and NAVSEA.
This Review Board was responsible for providing the
recommendations for award to the Source Selection Authority.
Between February and May [Ref. 26] twelve proposals from
eight offerors were received and evaluated. Best and Final
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Proposals were then requested from five offerors. The actual
selection criteria are contained in a "business sensitive"
Source Selection Plan (not available to the author). Such a
plan consists of a matrix with ratings, rankings and weights
applied to each proposal. The objective is to look for
•natural breaks' in the ratings. The final five were again
subjected to the rating matrix and two finalists were picked.
I. POLITICAL INFLUENCES IN THE CONTRACTING PROCESS
With the contracting process grinding slowly away,
political interest (and controversy) continued in Congress
[Ref. 27:p. 1], The Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs
had to "admit" to the Senate Armed Services manpower and
personnel subcommittee that the project had "slipped a year".
Senator Roger w. Jepson (R. Iowa) objected to this news and
when informed that the U. S. would have top convert passenger
ships on short notice (like the British in the Falklands War)
if there was a war, responded that this was "most
unacceptable" [Ref. 27:p. 1]
The Navy Surgeon General at the time, Vice Admiral J.
William Cox, also admitted there was a large medical support
gap that was only partially filled by such stop gap measures
as deployable madical support units (MMART's) and the upgrade
of medical spaces on amphibious ships (i.e. LHA's). When
Senator Jepson suggested the problem had been not only
neglected, but "ignored completely" by the Navy, Dr. Cox
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responded that it was his feeling the issue continually ended
up in the "too hard basket" [Ref. 27 :p. 4]. In another
interesting exchange Senator Jepson asked, "It currently
takes 21 months to de-mothball and convert a battleship. It
takes 3 years to build a nuclear attack submarine. How can
it take 4 years to convert a hospital ship?" Dr. Cox blamed
the problem on "the low priority that the hospital ship
(program) had received in Congress, as well as in DOD" . The
controversy over the Navy's handling of the design and
purchase of a hospital ship prompted a General Accounting
Office investigation.
In July 1982 [Ref. 24] contracts were awarded to APEX
Marine Corporation and Prudential Lines, Inc. for contract
design. APEX Marine Corporation was owner of the two San
Clemente Class supertankers which they proposed for
conversion to hospital ships. APEX entered into a 'Team
Arrangement 1 with National Steel and Shipbuilding Company
(NASSCO) of San Diego, California. The other design contract
went to Prudential Lines, Inc. which owned two LASH (dry
cargo) vessels and had a 'Joint Venture' company with
Maryland Shipbuilding and Construction Company, Baltimore
Maryland
.
J. TECHNICAL INFLUENCES IN THE CONTRACTING PROCESS
In the last six months of 1982 the original COR went
through three major revisions before it was finally released
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for the design competition. However, in January 1983 the
Navy changed the rules in the middle of the game. Mr. Sawer
(ASN, S&L) suddenly decided that the two finalists would be
in a strict cost competition instead of the originally
planned design to cost competition. According to NAVSEA,
[Ref. 24] contractor teams screamed about the change of rules
but Mr. Sawer stood firm. Both finalists had to completely
rework their proposals for the Phase II Evaluation process.
Between January and July the following actions took
place
:
1. a Phase II RFP was issued,
2. Phase II Source Selection Plan was approved,
3. proposals were received,
4. preliminary evaluation was completed,
5. requests went out for Best and Final Offer,
6. requests were received and
7. an evaluation was completed.
At the end of June 1983 a Firm Fixed Price contract (with
Economic Price Adjustment) was awarded to NASSCO.
K. POLITICAL INFLUENCES IN THE CONTRACT AWARD
In September PMJVC filed suit in U. S. District Court for
the District of Columbia seeking to overturn the award,
another Political controversy for the hospital ship project.
During House and Senate appropriations committee debates on
the fiscal year 1984 appropriations bill an attempt was made
to delay funding for the awarded contract. Representative
Steny Hoyer (D., Maryland) wanted the Navy to respond to
charges of improprieties made by lawyers for the unsuccessful
bidding team.
Then Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, issued a point
by point defense and stated, "the contract selection process
was properly and professionally conducted and the issues
raised by the unsuccessful offeror . . . without substance"
[Ref. 28 :p. 1], Both Appropriation committees accepted the
defense and approved funding for the project. In June 1984 a
summary judgement was issued in favor of the U. S. Navy.
PMJVC appealed that month to the U. S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia. In November 1984 PMJVC withdrew
their appeal. The action was withdrawn because NAVSEA had
been more than fair to the unsuccessful team [Ref. 26]. The
last evaluation process consisted of each contractor
submitting three envelopes: a cost proposal, a design
proposal, and contract enhancements. The winning team was
lowest in cost and closest to the COR in all three
evaluations. This was done even though only the first
envelope was required to be opened and evaluated.
L. PRODUCTION TPC INFLUENCES
In one sense the production of the two hospital ships
actually started in 1976 when the National Steel and
Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) built two "90,000 deadweight-
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ton supertankers to haul Mideast crude oil through the Suez
Canal" [Ref. 29 :p. 1] These two ships were actually in
service until the worldwide surplus of oil forced them into
early retirement.
In 1983 NASSCO won a $400 million contract to convert the
two ships to hospital vessels. From that time to the present
the Navy has spent another $110 million to outfit the ships
with the latest medical equipment. To support the proper
procurement and placement of the $110 million investment the
Department of the Navy (DON) and the Commander, Naval Medical
Command (NAVMEDCOM) has relied upon a plethora of medical
specialists and ship building specialists to advise the
contractor on the hospital ship project.
A list of the primary players includes: 1) Naval Medical
Command Medical Doctrine Center and Surface Medicine Code, 2)
Medical Construction Officer T-(AH) Project, 3) Supervisor of
Shipbuilding - Conversion and Repair, 4) Naval Sea Systems
Command, 5) NAVSCO New Construction Project Officer, 6) Navy
Medical Command, and 7) the Military Sealift Command.
M. MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND AS A TECHNICAL INFLUENCE
The Military Sealift Command, which will operate the USNS
MERCY and USNS COMFORT after contract delivery, has played an
essential advisory role during the Production Phase which
leads naturally to the Deployment Phase. The MSC has a
construction representative assigned to the T-AH project at
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NASSCO, to work closely with the commanding officer of the
USNS_MERCY
.
The MSC master is Capt . Hosey who has 34 years of
experience in the MSC Pacific Region. He sums up his view of
the production phase:
This can be a frustrating time for those of us who will
crew the ships. Someone else is administering the
shipbuilding contract for a vessel we have to sail, and
we have little say over how the ship is built or
converted. We are trying to identify all the
deficiencies of the ship which must be corrected before
we sail, and those that can be deferred. [Ref. 29 :p. 2]
The MSC has an ongoing relationship with the hospital
ships throughout the production phase of the program. In an
interview with the MSC Construction Representative ( CONREP
)
[Ref. 30], the involvement was found to be comprehensive.
The first function of the CONREP is to represent the
Commander, MSC, Washington, D. C, as an on-site survey and
engineering office. Such CONREP offices are located at any
shipyard where vessels will pass into MSC control.
The CONREP is under temporary duty (TEMDU) to SUPSHIP,
San Diego. The main role is as technical advisor on
conversion apsects of this project to bring the hospital
ships into compliance with MSC rules and regulations. The
CONREP office is composed of five people and is closely
involved with the various trials and testing of the hospital
ships. An example of CONREP involvement would be the check
off of a 'Test Memorandum' for each piece of hull and deck
equipment on the USNS MERCY. Such equipment might be
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lifeboats and cranes on the ship. These checks are prior to
the first sea trials.
The first sea trial is called a Builder's Trial and lasts
about two days. The general procedure is for personnel from
the CONREP office to write up Trial Cards on all
discrepancies found during the Builder's Trial. A screening
conference, another integrating TPC mechanism, is held in
part with CONREP and SUPSHIP personnel and representatives
from the contractor, in this case National Steel. The cards
are assigned to government or contractor responsibility to
repair or construct an item. If the area is uncertain it
undergoes government investigation until a decision is
reached. If the contractor feels a decision has gone against
him unfairly they can appeal through SUPSHIP and NAVSEASYSCOM
chain of command. If the decision favors the contractor, and
the work must be done to meet MSC regulations, a Field
Modification Request is filed by the MSC CONREP with SUPSHIP
so that a price can be negotiated with the contractor to
perform the work.
The second sea trial is called an Acceptance Trial and is
conducted in concert with a Board of Inspection and Survey
(INSURV) Team from Washington, D. C. This agency has a
statutory responsibility to inspect all newly constructed
USS and USNS vessels initially and approximately every three
years afterwards. This trial can last less than two days and
the procedure is the same as in the first sea trial except
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preprinted forms called TWO-KILOS are used as inspection
cards. These cards must be filled out in a prescribed and
detailed manner using a rank/order system from life
threatening to routine.
The third and final Acceptance Trial is actually
conducted during the deployment phase of the hospital ship.
This trial is conducted at the end of the Guarantee Period,
which in this case is eight months. This action will occur
as the USNS MERCY steams back from its humanitarian mission
to the Philippines. The trial will consist of the same
process and the first two times except that the trial cards
will be called Government Action Cards. These various
inspection cards used in the three different sea trials are
important because they formally document the various
Technical and Political influences between agencies involved
in the testing and evaluation of the hospital ship. The
cards are the focus of intense bargaining and negotiation at
the various screening conferences where competing agency TPC
influences are resolved. During the last of the three sea
trials the overall grading during these trials is not done as
a tactical warship but as a hybrid or USN, INSURV, MSC and
Coast Guard standards, many of which conflict with each other
and must be reconciled after each trial.
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N. SUPSHIP SAN DIEGO AS AN INTEGRATING MECHANISM
SUPSHIP, the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and
Repair, San Diego, plays a most important role in the
hospital ship program. SUPSHIPs are located at all shipyards
[Ref. 31] where ship repair, conversion or construction is
being conducted on government contracts. The SUPSHIP in San
Diego is the largest because of the amount of ship
construction taking place there.
SUPSHIP is foremost a contracting organization. It
administers the government contract with the prime
contractor, in this case National Steel. SUPSHIP prepares
contract specifications, oversees a design section and
conducts constant quality assurance on the project. Although
numerous other agencies are involved on the project, everyone
must go through SUPSHIP to request contract modifications or
to have the contractor do any kind of work. All the various
players in the project understand this, especially National
Steel
.
SUPSHIP is an organizational entity under the Commander,
Naval Sea Systems Command which gained importance after the
demise of U. S. Navy Shipyards. SUPSHIP is actually the
third and highest level of ship maintenance activity in the
Navy--the first two levels are shipboard activity and SIMA
(an intermediate level maintenance activity dealing with
relatively simple projects).
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There are actually two relatively independent sections
[Ref. 32] under the SUPSHIP organizational umbrella. One is
the Repair Section which is supervising other ship repair
projects at National Steel. The other section is New
Construction whose only project is the hospital ship program.
SUPSHIP reports to Code PMS 363-Auxillary and Special Mission
Ship Acquisition Project. This code reports to the Deputy
Commander of the Surface Ships Directorate, SEA 91. Code SEA
91, also called DEPCOM Surface Ships, reports directly to
Vice Commander and Commander, Naval Sea Systems Commmand
Headquarters
.
0. THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT OFFICE AS AN INTEGRATING MECHANISM
The Project Management Office (PMO), located in
Washington D. C. at the Naval Sea Systems Command, is the
main controlling and integrating mechanism for TPC influences
within and without the hospital ship project. The PMO
employs approximately sixty-five people and oversees up to
twenty-two programs at any one time, of which the hospital
ship program is one. The three teams mentioned earlier in
the chapter all operate within the authority of this office.
Configuration Management (CM) procedures, discussed in the
next chapter, are the primary change mechanisms used to
manage external and internal TPC influences exerted by the
various agencies involved in the project. For example, the
hospital ship Program Engineer [Ref. 33] stated that all
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major modifications must be approved by this office but that
routine modifications can be approved by SUPSHIP San Diego.
P. THE MEDICAL CONSTRUCTION OFFICE AS A TECHNICAL INFLUENCE
The Naval Medical Command also has an on-site
representative for technical input. The individual [Ref. 34]
is a Medical Service Corps officer designated as the Medical
Construction Officer, T-(AH) project, who works for SUPSHIP,
Conversion and Repair, San Diego. The Lieutenant-in-charge
heads an office composed of two officers and five enlisted
personnel. The enlisted personnel are hospital corpsmen
(independent duty and biomedical repairmen) and one dental
technician.
The officers and enlisted personnel are constantly
crawling through the medical and dental spaces aboard the
ships, reviewing drawings and specifications, and observing
the installation of equipment in these areas. This on-site
inspection has resulted in numerous contract modifications by
SUPSHIP.
The ongoing hospital ship program is helped because the
suggestions are made by the type of Medical Service Corps
Officers and enlisted ratings who will work on the hospital
ship during deployment. Frequent visits by medical and
dental officers from NAVMEDCOM also result in suggestions for
equipment modification and placement.
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Actual production of the two hospital ships started with
a simple fact--no one had ever turned a former supertanker
into a hospital ship. The SS WORTH became the USNS MERCY,
and the SS_ROSE CITY became the USNS COMFORT. One reason
supertanker hulls were selected (besides cost competition) is
that "Navy ship designers say (such hulls) lend themselves
well to the needs of massive floating hospitals. They cite
the designs inherent stability and low center of gravity,
resulting in a unique anti-roll feature." [Ref. 35:p. 32]
Each ship is 894 feet long. The largest of the
supertankers are over 1,244 feet long and an idea of size can
be gained by the height of the Empire State Building which is
1,250 feet high [Ref. 36 :p 383]. Although the hospital ships
are not built from the keel up, they come close! First the
deck was removed from the supertanker leaving only the shell,
engine room and athwartship watertight-bulkheads intact [Ref.
37:5]. Then 3,200 tons of steel and over 13 miles of piping
were removed from each ship.
One source [Ref. 37 :p. 7] states that U. S. shipyards
have lost their competitive edge and have been forced to
reimport shipbuilding technology that the Japanese have
improved on. The new technology involves using modular, mass
production methods. One method is called the "on unit
concept" in which [Ref. 37:p. 9] an entire unit of equipment
is made outside the ship and then placed in the hull and
welded to a deck.
78
In the on-block concept, several units with foundations
are welded to a single deck section off ship. Other
units and deck may be welded on top of the first, and
then the entire block is hoisted into the hull for
installation [Ref. 37:p. 9].
The "on-board" concept means that the installation takes
place with the ship. These blocks are constructed with ample
workroom and ventilation and greatly increased safety. They
are usually constructed upside down which helps the welds to
flow by taking advantage of gravity.
Using the blue sky concept [Ref. 37:p. 10], blocks below
the waterline are constructed and installed first, then
any associated equipment not installed at the on-block
stage is landed on the ship prior to the installation of
the deck or block immediately above.
The traditional method was much more complex and costly. It
involved building each room inside the ship including all
electrical, piping and vent systems. Thus the actual
production of the hospital ships has been as unique as the
supertanker/hospital ship concept.
Q. NAVAL MEDICAL MATERIAL SUPPORT COMMAND AS A TECHNICAL
INFLUENCE
The Naval Medical Material Support Command, Fredrick, MD
has played a significant role as the primary outfitter [Ref.
38] for all medical government furnished equipment (GFE).
There are two categories of medical GFE onboard the hospital
ships. They are called Authorized Medical Allowance Lists
( AMAL ' s ) and Authorized Dental Allowance Lists ( ADAL ' s )
.
Approximately $30 million has been spent on each hospital
ship on items ranging from medical consumables to
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medical/dental x-ray equipment. GFE is established on the
hospital ships in three ways; through the AMAL/ADAL lists,
mission specific needs (i.e. humanitarian cruises), and
shipboard medical staff requests.
As a current example of this process the USNS MERCY
mission to the Philippines provides a good example. The
AMAL/ADAL lists are based on a wartime shock/trauma unit
basis. GFE such as pediatrics equipment and items for large
scale immunization programs have been added that were never
initially considered for a hospital ship operating in a war
zone. The acquisition cycle for these items has been running
90-180 days. GFE is purchased primarily stateside but many
items have come from around the world.
Contingency support will be provided to the hospital
ships through regular OPN (Other Procurement, Navy)
procedures as the equipment life cycles for medical and
dental items expire. Ongoing research continues to find the
best equipment suitable for the hospital ship mission in the
unique demands of the afloat hospital environment.
R. DEPLOYMENT PHASE TPC INFLUENCES
The deployment phase of the hospital ship program has
proven to be an interesting one from a political standpoint
and from the switch in original intentions. The hospital
ships after construction and sea trials were initially
scheduled to go into a AReduced Operating Status (ROS) [Ref.
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39:p. 25 ] --basically a caretaking status until mobilized on a
wartime or national disaster contingency basis.
The idea for some type of humanitarian mission evidently
originated with Assistant Secretary of Defense William Mayer
in late 1985 [Ref. 40:p. 8]. Dr. Mayer thought the United
States and its Navy could "show the flag" in Third World
ports around the globe to conduct Project Hope type projects.
This would essentially involve large scale immunization and
public health programs in various countries. One way of
doing this would be to carry a Fleet Hospital onboard to
deploy at each visit.
Another idea of Dr. Mayer's would use [Ref. 41: p. 9] the
hospital ships:
as sort of a major worldwide continuing education
process. When they are near a first world country like
Scotland, we could conduct jointly with the University of
Edinburgh and some civilian universities in this country
really massive graduate education programs on disaster
medicine, one of the world's great needs today.
The first mention of a humanitarian mission to the
Philippines [Ref. 41 :p. 4] originated with the White House.
It was mentioned as primarily a preventive medicine program
to be funded from $10 million in emergency aid authorized for
the Philippines by President Reagan. This source mentions
that there are not many ports in the Philippines which can
handle a supertanker sized hospital ship. As mentioned
earlier a helicopter support squadron will probably have to
be deployed with the ship since the USNS MERCY has limited
capacity to transfer patients from the sea.
A related Political influence and side effect of this
mission was the Navy's assurance that the deployment "will
have no impact on the availability of care in Stateside
military facilities" [Ref. 42:p. 25]. The Navy did admit
that the availability of inpatient care might slow down.
With all the problems Navy medicine has had lately this
announcement did not sit well with many military special
interest groups. This is the reason DOD has made the mission
a tri-service effort with Reserve augmentation [Ref. 42 :p. 2]
whenever possible.
Dr. Mayer disagreed with the Navy's plans [Ref. 42: p. 2]
for the hospital ships after the humanitarian deployments.
He still wants a continuing deployment of some type for the
hospital ships. The biggest obstacle to this idea is the
funding situation, and the problems of manning the vessel in
peacetime. But this Political infighting, with White House
involvement, shows how the original idea has evolved from the
original ROS status. A humanitarian mission is also planned
for the USNS COMFORT in the Atlantic Basin.
Depending on the degree of success of the Philippines
mission we just might see many more deployments of the
hospital ships. A Political influence can be found with the
Cubans. They not only deploy military personnel in the
countries they assist, but also many health care personnel
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such as doctors and nurses. In many such cases these
countries have limited medical expertise and this goes quite
a distance in winning hearts and minds. The author thinks
Dr. Mayer summed up the situation quite well [Ref. 42 :p. 2]
when he said: " . . . a great big white ship with a red
cross and the American flag is a whole different message than
a battleship .
"
S. NAVAL MEDICAL COMMAND TPC INFLUENCES
The NAVMEDCOM code concerned with Surface Medicine has
played a key role in the production and deployment of the two
hospital ships. An interview with CAPT Hooper [Ref. 43]
revealed the uniqueness of the hospital ship program. He
mentioned that there are four key players in the ongoing
deployment of the USNS MERCY. The agencies and their roles
are
:
1. OPNAV 093 and 42 - Resource Control
2. CINCPACFLT - Operational Control
3. MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND - Administrative Control
4. NAVAL MEDICAL COMMAND - Technical Control
Surface Medicine has served as the primary liaison with
the Naval Sea Systems Command which has overall control of
the building of the hospital ships through its PMO and
subordinate offices. This Code provided detailed Technical
advice on medical and dental issues dealing with space design
and construction, equipment, supplies, manning, and
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inspections. During the recent operational demonstration of
the USNS MERCY this Code conducted a simulated patient flow
from the helicopter landing pad through surgery, post op and
genral ward placement.
One noticeable problem identified on the MERCY, was the
lack of patient access by small boats. The main transfer
point is by helicopters and reflects a historical bias from
the Vietnam War. Both the USS SANCTUARY and REPOSE were
fully supported by helicopters to deliver patients and rarely
received patients from another ship. CAPT Hooper agreed with
the author that all options should be covered and that a
future modification of the hospital ships will involve the
installation of an access port to solve this problem.
The Naval Medical Command, Contingency Planning Code is
responsible for the staffing of the hospital ships in port
and on deployment. Although the current humanitarian mission
of the USNS MERCY to the Philippines is a tri-
service/civilian effort, the majority of the personnel will
be composed of U. S. Navy personnel. The proposed ship's



















Total Military 1,207 [Ref. 43]
The COMFORT is scheduled to make a humanitarian cruise in
Atlantic waters in late 1987. During wartime, medical Navy
reservists will fill many of the billets now being filled by
active duty personnel on the humanitarian cruises.
T. SUMMARY
This chapter has attempted to document the various TPC
influences involved in the hospital ship project initiation,
production and deployment phases. Each of the agencies
involved exerted their particular Technical and Political
influences, and to a much lesser extent, Cultural influences.
Although the Technical and Political influences are readily
identifiable to the reader, the Cultural influences are not.
Since sources of information refused to be put 'on the
record' suffice it to say that the military medical culture
and the military shipbuilding culture often did not mesh
well. The TPC integration mechanism of Configuration
Management (CM) was fully utilized to resolve conflicts and




CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT AND TPC THEORY IN THE
HOSPITAL SHIP PROGRAM
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will attempt to explain the role of
Configuration Management (CM) as a change mechanism to be
used within the TPC Model. There are many different types of
change mechanisms that can be used to promote and manage
change--this is one more tool that can be added to the
manager's toolchest. Configuration management is a unique
vehicle for managing TPC influences and changes because it
is already established by DOD regulations and directives, and
practiced by some U. S. Navy Syscoms, for example the Naval
Sea Systems Command.
Configuration Management (CM) definitions, history,
policy, and the role of CM in a medical environment will be
commented on. The specific categories of CM documentation
will be explained. Lists of each type of change can be found
in Appendix B.
B. CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT AND TPC CHANGE LEVERS
Tichy [Ref. l:p. 6] lists change levers such as external
interface, mission, strategy, managing organizational
mission/strategy processes, tasks, prescribed networks,
organizational processes such as communication, problem
solving and decision making, people and emergent networks. A
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change lever is a subcomponent of an organization used to
initiate and manage change in that organization.
As will be seen in the following sections, configuration
management touches upon most of these change levers used for
managing change in an organization. As a quick preview,
configuration management forces communication between all
interested parties. Through its structure, problem solving
and decision making are of paramount importance. Many of the
changes in the configuration of the hospital ships resulted
from the outside environment as well as internal contract
considerations. Decisions made regarding the mission and
strategy of the hospital ships were formalized, managed, and
documented through configuration management procedures. Both
the formal chain-of-command and informal "grapevine"
(emergent networks) were used to manage the changes.
C. CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT DEFINITIONS
Configuration Management (CM) may be defined as: "the
process that identifies the functional and physical
characteristics of an item during its life cycle, controls
changes to those characteristics, and provides information on
the status of change actions." [Ref. 45 :p. 6]




3. Status accounting, and
4. Audits.
The primary emphasis in this chapter will be on configuration
control outside of the purview of SUPSHIP San Diego. The
three other areas will only briefly be commented on.
A configuration management program is required for
government contracts involving major acquisitions. The
hospital ship program is not considered such an acquisition,
but a CM program is in place as part of the normal business
procedure of SUPSHIP San Diego. Such a program has many
benefits. These include a current description of the
developing hospital ship, an audit trail and history of
changes to a particular item, and documentation of the
reasoning behind the change. CM contains the written
foundation for future analysis and correction of errors,
ensures that such errors are corrected in a cost efficient
manner, and "ensures that such errors are corrected in a cost
efficient manner, and "ensures that the system can be
maintained and modified at minimum cost and down time" [Ref.
45:p. 11-1]
.
Changes will certainly occur throughout the life
expectancy of the hospital ship due to changes in mission
requirements (i.e. humanitarian deployments) and changes in
political factors affecting cost and schedule influences on
hospital ship design.
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Ruckert [Ref. 46:pp. 4-87] confirms the CM definition and
adds that it is a discipline applying administrative
direction and surveillance in performing the four functions.
It states that the purpose of configuration management: "is
to prevent engineering anarchy and permit orderly
development, recording, reproduction, and support of a
system. CM is intended to control configuration changes,
not to prevent them." [Ref. 46:pp. 4-88]
A philosophy emerges here that briefly sums up the main
problem with the hospital ship program. The Navy Program
Manager's Guide [Ref. 46:pp. 4-88] states that: "effective
(CM) control procedures will hopefully eliminate the nice-
but-not-necessary changes that keep designs in a state of
turmoil, lead to litigation, and unnecessarily burden the
logistic support system and training program."
OPNAVINST 4130. 2A of 16 December 1985 provides the basic
policy and objectives of the Navy Configuration Management
System ( NCMS ) used in the construction and maintenance of the
USNS MERCY and USNS COMFORT. The general policy of the NCMS
is that of a "cradle to grave evolution". This means that
integrating the CM elements starts with the initial contract
acquisition and continues until the system under CM is
scraped at the end of its life time. By definition this will
mean a great deal of coordination between the cognizant
government activities and private industry. The formal
structure of a NCMS system will increase communication and
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the capability for standardizing procedures and practices of
CM throughout the Navy in dealing with private industry.
The objectives of the NCMS are defined and enumerated
{Ref. 47 :p. 2] as follows: "Many discrepancies perceived as
logistics support problems are directly attributable to
inadequate configuration management. The objectives of CM
are to obtain and maintain:
1. Effective planning to ensure that the elements of
CM are appropriately implemented for each CI
during each phase of its life-cycle.
2. An optimum degree of design and development
latitude and yet introduce the elements of CM at
the appropriate time, degree and depth.
3. Visibility of development progress and compliance
with design requirements during the acquisition
process
.
4. Appropriate interfaces and coordination.
5. Efficient processing, control and implementation
of configuration changes.
6. Adequate and verified technical documentation and
configuration status accounting records to
satisfy total program needs.
7. Desired life-cycle costs and the required level
of operational readiness, supportability
,
interchangeability and interoperability through
standardization and ILS consideration.
8. Accurate and timely knowledge of the current
configuration of the CI .
"
D. CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT HISTORY
Configuration management and control as a distinct
process can be traced back to the 1950' s when a series of
program management initiatives were instituted by government
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(customer) /industry (contractor) teams [Ref. 48:p. 7].
Configuration management and other initiatives (i.e., data
management or systems engineering) in the 1960's were brought
under tighter control by the Department of Defense through a
series of instructions and directives. Among others the
reason was to ensure "consistency with overall DOD policy and
direction and compatibility with other management
disciplines." It is said that nothing succeeds like success,
and configuration management has been successful in the sense
that it is still around today— it has stood the test of time.
Roveling [Ref. 49 :p. 88] provides the following succinct
The principles and procedures of configuration management
have been developed and applied in many system programs
during the past 25 years. They originated as a set of
techniques for controlling and verifying changes to
operational military equipment. These were revised and
expanded in the early 1960's to cover the preparation and
control of specifications during the definition and
acquisition phases of a system program.
Configuration management is a unique vehicle to balance
the Technical, Political and Cultural influences in the
hospital ship project. Configuration management,
particularly the management approval mechanisms within it are
enough to adapt to changing TPC environments.
Acker [Ref. 48:p. 10] states:
The application of configuration and data management must
be carefully tailored to be consistent with the quantity,
size, scope, stage of life-cycle, nature, and complexity
of the system/end product involved. Program managers
need to tailor the procedures that have been established




Configuration management has been praised by many because
its structure forces the government and contractor to
communicate with each other. Configuration management is
again a unique vehicle to enforce this communication and
therefore align and balance the various technical, political
and cultural influences within the hospital ship project.
The structured management approval mechanisms enhance this
communication process and thereby the balancing of the TPC
influences
.
E. CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT POLICY
The state policy of the Department of the Navy (DON)
covering the initiation and approval of changes is as
follows
:
. . . configuration control will be exercised rigorously,
and that no changes which effect the approved
configuration (delineated by the contract specifications)
of an item shall be made in the items on their
documentation, except thos which are necessary of offer
substantial benefits to the Government. [Ref. 50 :p.
1202]
Changes are limited to five categories which benefit the
government. Changes can:
1. Correct errors of deficiencies,
2. Upgrade capability (i.e., humanitarian deployment
to the Philippines),
3. Achieve a net life-cycle cost savings to the
Government
.
4. Upgrade capability and achieve a net life-cycle
cost savings, and
5. Provide for the safety of personnel of equipment.
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All approved changes are divided into two categories
which are a) Headquarters Modification Requisitions ( HMRs
)
and b) Field Modification Requisitions ( FMRs ) . These
categories are defined by various levels of approval
authority and dollar thresholds which will be defined
shortly
.
Another issue in configuration management arises when a
proposed change is accomplished under the hospital ship
contract. All approved changes are categorized as essential
or optional—which is a matter of judgement of SUPSHIP San
Diego and NAVSEA Headquarters.
Essential changes are defined as: [Ref. 50:p. 1203]
The changes that are necessary for essential military or
operational requirements, and must be done by the
contractor under the contract prior to delivery of the
ship to the Government. They include items that would
effect the ship's ability to perform her mission if not
accomplished prior to delivery of the ship, and certain
necessary technical improvements for military
reliability, safety, and important operational features.
They also may include changes for repairs to Government-
Furnished Materials (GFM), Government-responsible trial
items the Headquarters directs to be performed prior to
delivery of the ship, Government-responsible system
defects and repairs under conversion contracts. (Such as
the hospital ship program)
.
Optional changes [Ref. 50:p. 1204] are:
those technically approved changes that do not have to be
accomplished before delivery of the vessel by the
contractor. To be truly optional a change must be
subject to cancellation without later accomplishment, or
accomplishment deferred until after the Government
accepts delivery of the vessel. All changes that have
been classified as optional may be implemented only by a
contract modification which establishes the price and
delivery impact of the change . . .
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The author of this thesis proposes that only by
understanding the nature and influence of the various
Technical, Political and Cultural influences within and
without the hospital ship project can a sound basis be
prepared for the future logistic support of the hospital
ships. Configuration management and control is the
methodology for channeling the TPC influences into the end
product of a hospital ship. It is a continuing configuration
management program that will be of great benefit to the
individual hospital ship commands, and the Naval Medical
command as a whole.
Although this thesis is restricted in scope to
identifying the TPC influences and the management approval
mechanisms through which they are funneled there is an
overall long term goal. Dean [Ref. 51:p. 21] states it
succinctly as: "The purpose of configuration management, at
the bottom line, is to ensure the continuing logistics
supportability of systems in the government inventory."
F. THE ROLE OF CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
The role of configuration management is integrating
Technical, Political and Cultural influences is not likely to
diminish or stay in equilibrium. The need for CM will grow.
As medical projects grow ever more complex, be they hospital
ships or sickbays aboard combatant ships, the need for
managing the often conflicting influences will continue to be
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felt. Dean [Ref. 51 :p. 37] believes the basic structure of
configuration management will not change but the working
tools will. These tools include increased use of
mathematical modelling, automation and computerization of the
project under configuration control and the TPC influences
impacting on the project.
As the medical projects grow more complex, there is no
reason not to believe that the TPC environment within and
without the project will also become more complex and
dynamic, particularly as resources become more constrained.
This has been the trend in naval medicine. The author
expects this trend to continue in direction, if not in
intensity.
Dean [Ref. 51 :p. 37] sums up overall (medical)
configuration management:
If we look into the future, we see a new frontier in
configuration and data management. Our challenge is to
define it and apply our innovation and imagination to the
solution of its problems. We must evolve with the times
by using the technology of tomorrow to manage the
products of tomorrow. If we don't, we are in danger of
becoming obsolete. The message is clear. We msut
promote today the discipline, tools, and caliber of
personnel required to manage tomorrow's sophisticated
world of configuration and data management.
The author strongly believes the Naval Medical Command
possesses the requisite personnel and resources to
successfully implement a medical configuration management
program.
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Although configuration management is a process which can
readily handle all Technical, Political and Cultural
influences Fohnman [Ref. 52 :p. 55] believes the individual
configuration manager can handle the Technical influences the
best. This author's view's: "configuration management as
involving three elements: administrative, clerical and
technical management."
He accuses many in the field of being little more than
administrative and clerical functionaries and of ignoring the
real purpose of the position—technical management. This
author states there are two reasons for this:
1. The administrative and clerical emphasis of most
configuration management instructions, and
2. The lack of engineers in positions of
configuration managers.
The author's preference for engineers is quite obvious:
We have found that, generally, the technically oriented
configuration manager does a better job than a
nontechnical person and, specifically, that the
configuration managers who are engineers tend to do the
best job. The reasons seem to be that there is no
credibility gap when dealing engineer to engineer, and
that the depth of understanding of technical problems
tends to be greater, therefore stimulating
questions/discussions that lead to better configuration
management performance.
The lesson in this quote for the Naval Medical Command in
implementing a configuration management program is that
technically oriented individuals attuned to the ever changing
technology of medical equipment and medical design will be
the best choices for medical configuration management. But
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even the best technical person will be unsuccessful if he
ignores the Political and Cultural considerations of his job.
The author further states that "configuration management
activities are not normally visible to top management".
Therefore the Political and Cultural aspects of a military
medical CM position are as important as the technical
aspects
.
Only a strong configuration management program can
balance the competing TPC influences to keep a project under
cost and on schedule. Source after source documents this.
For example:
The key to controlling engineering changes and the
configuration of the production line lies with the
techniques and discipline within a well structured
configuration management function enjoying full support
of the Program Manager . . . Control of engineering
changes was made possible through the consistent,
disciplined application of good judgement, technical
competence, and management techniques which are necessary
to achieve and maintain program balance. [Ref. 54 :p. 1]
The author goes on to state that:
Program Management is often referred to as the
'management of change', which it certainly is in the
broadest sense. However, all too often this broad
interpretation of the management of change has not
properly included change management. In this more
limited context, change management is one of the major
functions of configuration management . . . [Ref. 54:p.l]
Powers [Ref. 53] also recognized that there are discrete
'Forces for Change' that fit into the TPC framework— they
are :
1. The contractor and associated technical
representatives
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2. The User in separating goals from requirements
3. Changes in personnel
4. Changes in requirements dictated by expanded missions
5. Changes by altered threats.
Changes in user personnel affect the program in several
ways. At the headquarters level, the replacements of
those who helped design the system by evaluating and
suggesting changes from the user's point of view do not
always agree with their predecessors. [Ref. 53:p. 16]
Without configuration management follow-up on a project
. . . the only way out of the tangle was to spend many
dollars and much time. The out-of-control condition was
not an inevitable thing and would not have developed had
the government maintained the configuration control it
has exercised up to that point. Apparent ly
,
good
configuration management is a habit difficult to_acguire
and_eas i ly_fgrgo t ten . [Ref. 53:28]
and
. . . there is no clear answer to the question--How many
changes should be made? All that can be said is that
change management is an essential part of cost management
and changes must be made in response to a dynamic
environment. The Program Manager must recognize the
forces at work and achieve the balance. [Ref. 53 :p. 34]
G. CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT MEDICAL ENVIRONMENT
Powers [Ref. 53 :p. 1] comments on the balancing act of
technical, political and cultural forces that the process of
configuration management strives to address.
One school of thought is that a continual flow of changes
are necessary to continually improve the product, its
usefulness, its value, its production, its maintenance,
etc. Another is that design configurations should be
frozen once a workable, useful design has been achieved.
Both positions have a great deal of merit and the TPC
influences inherent in a project determine to what degree a
98
project will move on the continuum between the two extremes.
The author goes on to state:
that changes do, over a given cycle of time,
improve a product, make it better, more useful and
simplify its manufacture and maintenance. In addition,
there is a continuing advancement in the general state of
particular product involved. On the other hand, design
freeze results in the desired economies of stabilized
production processes, tooling, and quality control, plus
standardized specifications and stabilization of the
maintenance and supply situation.
The hospital ship project is an ideal example of this
balancing act and the pull of the two extremes. There are
strong TPC influences for more and better medical equipment
and technology onboard the hospital ships. At the same time
there are very real cost and schedule considerations, along
with long term logistics support considerations and their
cost aspects that must be balanced.
Graham [Ref. 54 :p. 2] supports the general consensous of
authors in this field when writing:
A middle ground, somewhere between the excessive issuance
of changes and no changes at all would probably be best,
though. And the answer is Cqnf^gurat ion_Management
.
Properly administered, the configuration management
program should result in an optimum situation with
respect to changes, economies and the ever important
advancement in the state of the art.
The Naval Medical Command, and the individual hospital
ship commands, need to establish and maintain formal
configuration management and control programs. On the
surface this will not be greeted with great enthusiasm from
anybody. The following quote [Ref. 55 :p. 28] provides a
glimpse of the reasons:
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The problem is, where will you find the person with the
qualification to accomplish those configuration
management tasks for you? For many years, configuration
managers have been 'configuration recorders', required
merely to track and record the accomplishment of various
program activities without participating in the initial
decisions about the tasks. The configuration manager has
acquired a reputation as a 'paper pusher' and a stick in
the mud'
.
... the configuration manager all too
frequently receives sparse recognition or praise for his
efforts and management expertise. The resulting feelings
of low esteem and low status compared to other functional
managers have led to a perception of poor career
progression and low promotability within the
configuration management field.
If the Navy Medical Command and hospital ship commands
follow up on this recommendation, the aforementioned pitfall
perceptions can be avoided with strong "front office' support
for the CM program implemented. This support includes
rewarding individuals appropriately for a successful CM tour.
Carr [Ref. 56:p. 21] talks about the recurring headaches
(to the supply officer) that occur when repair parts for
equipment are not onboard after deployment. The author
states
:
. . . your ship needs a solid Configuration Management
program, and why improper or nonexistent shipboard
Configuration Management remains one of the primary
contributions to poor shipboard logistics support. To be
effective Configuration Management should be an
aggressive ongoing program of verification of all
allowance documentation for installed equipments onboard
a particular ship.
This reference states the following steps are necessary
to implement a viable Configuration Management program aboard
ship
:
1. Designate a ship's Configuration Officer (usually
Supply Officer or 3-M Coordinator
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2. All work center personnel should become familiar
with the COSAL Use and Maintenance Manual
3. Routinely, equipment changes and documentation
should be identified, confirmed and corrected
using OPNAV 4790/OK (Ships Configuration Change
Form)
4. Ensure all configuration changes are documented
accurately and correctly on a timely basis.
H. TIMING OF CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT CHANGES
Configuration Management not only deals with the
justification for, and documentation of changes, it also
deals with the impact of the timing of changes. [Ref. 57: p.
58] states:
Poorly tj.med_changes may unnecessarily disrupt contractor
operations, create scrap or rework, and/or generally
increase cost to the Government. Delayed changes, on the
other hand, may jeopardize corrective actions designed to
avoid fatal or serious injury to operation personnel.
Inadequate attention to how changes are ordered may lead
to disputes and claims by the contractor.
An example of changes implemented in an unanticipated and
rushed schedule were the 'finishing touches' for the USNS
MERCY in 1986. This process was yet another example in which
Naval Sea Systems Command in general , and SUPSHIP San Diego
in particular, were caught in the middle of events. The
deployment phase of the USNS MERCY was touched upon in
Chapter Four but it's effect on the configuration management
control process was significant.
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Both NASSCO and NAVSEA were pressured to finish the ship
months ahead of schedule and were rushed in particular to
finish the multitude of Two-Kilo cards generated by the Board
of Inspection and Survey during the Acceptance Trial. The
majority of the discrepancies were corrected, particularly
the safety items. Although difficult to measure
quantitatively, there was an increased cost to both the
government and the contractor in trying to complete the
INSURV inspection changes in a compressed schedule.
Personnel at all the agencies, involved agreed that the
process as conducted was neither optimal nor the preferred
way of doing business. But the configuration management
control process did work even when operation under
unanticipated and shortened deadlines.
I. SEA TRIALS AND THE MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND IN THE
CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PROCESS
One of the great advantages of a formalized configuration
management control system is the corporate knowledge as
represented in the documentation of the reasons for change.
The sister ship of the USNS MERCY, and the USNS COMFORT, has
benefited greatly in the 'lessons learned' category in
constructing the second ship. NASSCO was helped in
particular by the documentation in the form of trial cards
for the Builder's Trial, the first of the series of sea
trials the hospital ships go through. The preparation for,
and conduct of the Builder's Trial went much more smoothly
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than the first one (on the MERCY) due to the voluminous
amount of change documentation kept at the construction site
at NASSCO.
The Military Sealift Command plays a integral role in the
configuration management process. [Ref. 58] The onsite
function is through MSC participation during construction of
the ships and the Builder's Trial and Acceptance Trial. This
process, as well as the Final Acceptance Trial during the
Guarantee Period, were outlined in Chapter Four.
The MSC CONREP Office reviews and proposes modifications
to the hospital ships. The review function of contractor
proposals is part of their job as attached to SUPSHIP San
Diego. Proposed configuration management changes can
originate at the field level or from the Engineering Code at
Military Sealift Command Headquarters. Copies of completed
reviews and proposals, in the form of internal memos for
modifications are sent through the SUPSHIP/NAVSEA chain of
command and to MSC headquarters. Close coordination and
communication is maintained at all times through this dual
reporting process. The connection to NAVSEA is from two
directions
,
1. Up, through SUPSHIP San Diego, and,
2. Across, from MSC HQ Engineering which supplies
the MSC voting member to the NAVSEA PMS
Configuration Control Board.
The post-construction configuration management phase
starts from the actual delivery of the hospital ship to the
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Navy and lasts for the full eight months of the Guarantee
Period as called for in the contract. This period is a
warranty period in which all Contractor Furnished Material
(CFM) is supposed to work without failure for eight months.
The other category of material, Government Furnished Material
(GFM) is also tested and inspected during this period but the
contractor does not have to pay for the failure of this
equipment unless it is proven that it was installed
incorrectly
.
The MSC crew during the Guarantee Period writes up
Guarantee Deficiency Reports on all CFM equipment. MSC
personnel such as Engineering and Deck Officers, and MTF
department heads, forward their respective GDR's to the Chief
Engineer who reviews and transmits these reports to NAVSEA
and MSC HQ . These reports are part of "Rolling-Over"
configuration management information when building subsequent
ships of the same class. For example the humanitarian
deployment of the USNS MERCY to the Philippines provided
valuable information for the construction of the USNS COMFORT
the following year.
A somewhat unique arrangement of resolving configuration
management changes is the presence of a Guaranty Engineer
aboard the hospital ship for the entire Guaranty period.
This individual is an employee of the prime contractor
(NASCO) but is paid for by the Navy under provisions of the
contract. The Guaranty Engineer attempts to correct as many
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CFM deficiencies as possible while underway or in foreign
ports
.
After the Guarantee Period MSC involvement in the
configuration management process does not stop. When for
example the USNS MERCY is homeported in Oakland, CA the
actual berth will be at an MSC maintenance facility. A
complete archive of all configuration management
documentation should be located at both the shore facility
and aboard the hospital ship. The archive's purpose will be
to facilitate future maintenance and modifications by
providing a fund of corporate knowledge of lessons learned.
This archive will be directed mainly at hull, deck and
machinery spaces the MSC is responsible for, and not the MTF
spaces since the assigned medical personnel are responsible
for equipment maintenance.
J. CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT DOCUMENTATION
In discussing the various types of configuration
management control documentation (HMR, FMR , RFW, RFD , and
PMP ) it is important to note that there are various levels of
approval for each type of document. There are four levels of








It is beyond the scope of this thesis to cover the myriad of
details of approval for each change. However, in general,
[Ref. 50:p. 1207] "the greater the technical, cost, and/or
schedule impact of a proposed change, the higher the
organizational level of approval."
The overall goal in this chapter is to enumerate the variety
of types and causes of configuration management control
changes of the hospital ship project rather than to review
the minutiae of detail in how these changes are administra-
tively pursued through the chain of command.
Whether changes are Technically, Politically or
Culturally influenced, they all fall into the following
categories
:
1. Engineering Change Proposal (ECP),
2. Request for Waiver (RFW).
3. Request for Deviation ( RFD )
,
4. Field Modification Request (FMR),
5. Headquarters Modification Request (HMR),
A complete listing of all categories and associated
dollar amounts can be found in Appendix B. Each category
will be defined and an example (or notable examples) will be




Engineering Change Proposal (ECP)
As defined in MIL-STD-481 an engineering change is
[Ref. 59:p. 2]:
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an alteration in the configuration of an item, delivered,
to be delivered, or under development, after formal
establishment of its configuration identification. An
engineering change proposal therefore is a term which
includes both a proposed engineering change and the
documentation by which the change is described and
suggested
.
DOD-STD 480A goes into exhaustive detail on the
requirements for engineering changes, and the internal
classifications for such changes. Once again this thesis
will forego such a detailed discussion and instead stay with
the broad categories of documented changes with representa-
tive examples and how they fit into the change process.
Examples of ECP ' s are red cross markings for the
lifeboats, floor covering in the operation room, installing
additional autoclaves (laboratory) or telephones
(administration), or correcting discrepancies in any part of
the ship. SUPSHIP San Diego ECP computer printouts did not
list specific costs but did note affected specifications and
drawings and any related FMR's or HMR s
.
2 . Request for Waiver (RFW)
A Request for Waiver (RFW) is an "after-the-fact"
action. The prime contractor has completed a specific
segment of the contract and later it is found out (either
through government or contractor quality assurance efforts)
that the job does not meet contract specification. The SACAM
states [Ref. 50:p. 1233]:
Requests for waivers may indicate defects in the
contractor's quality assurance and inspection procedures,
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and the SUPSHIP surveillance of these procedures.
MIL-STD-481 [Ref 59 :p. 2] defines a waiver as "a written
authorization to accept an item which during production
or after having been submitted for inspection, is found
to depart from specified requirements, but nevertheless
is considered suitable for use 'as is 1 or after rework by
an approved method.
Examples of RFW's are lighting requirements in
different spaces of the hospital ship, lubricating systems,
types of paint, adhesives for decks and alarms.
3 • Request for Deviation (RFD)
A Request for Deviation (RFD) is a before-the-fact
action. A deviation, as defined in MIL-STD-481 [Ref. 59:p.
1] is:
a specific written authorization, granted prior to the
manufacture of an item, to depart from a particular
performance or design requirement of a specification,
drawing or other documents, for a specific number of
units or a specific period of time.
RFD ' s include changes to piping systems, doors and
passageways, insulation, painting, deck tile, dental and
laboratory equipment and even hospital ship lettering.
4 • Field Modification Requisition (FMR)
As described by SUPSHIP San Diego [Ref. 60], a Field
Modification requisition (FMR) is an idea or concept
initiated at the field contracting activity level. It does
not fit any of the preceding categories and does not have any
particular dollar threshold.
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A good example of an FMR is the feasibility study for
medical storage that was funded and compiled, and ended up as
a project manager proposal. Medical storage areas aboard the
hospital ships were increased from the original estimate
after calculation showed the growing authorized medical
allowance lists (AMAL) would not fit within the estimated
original storage areas.
5 • Headquarters Modification Requisition (HMR)
Like the FMR, the headquarters modification
requisition (HMR) is a concept or idea originated within the
Project Manager's Office at Naval Sea Systems Command. HMR
s
therefore do not fit any of the preceding categories and does
not have a dollar range. The difference between the FMR and
an HMR are the respective staffs, and specialties within each
staff, when modification requisitions are proposed.
As a corollary to the preceding example, the actual
authorization and funding of the increase in AMAL storage
space, once the PMP was approved, was administratively
handled as an HMR. Another example would be the small marine
sanitation device (MSD) provided for the reduced operating
status (ROS) crew when in homeport status.
K. CURRICULUM OF REQUIREMENTS (COR)
1 • COR Evoluti on
Configuration management changes in their most
preliminary and fluid form are demonstrated in the evolution
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of the four Curriculum of Requirements (COR's) (although only
the first and last COR's were actually published.
The COR's were jointly developed between the Naval
Sea Systems Command—represented by the Project Manager's
Office, and the Naval Medical Command—represented by it's
Surface Medicine Code and Medical Liaison Officer. The
following COR History shows the lifespan of the effort.
There were complex TPC influences in the evolution, but
participants were reluctant to speak 'on the record 1 in
separating out specific technical, political and cultural
influences
.
The COR History as outlined by the hosptial ship
program manager is as follows:
31 July 1981 - Original Grey COR
21 July 1982 - Blue COR - Minor revisions intended to
incorporate several changes approved
during the proposal phase for phase I.
25 August 1982 - Red COR - Never officially released to
the offerors. This was a major revision
to the original requirements, and was
considered too severe a reduction in
capability.
21 October 1982 - Yellow COR - Final approved document
released to offerors. [Ref. 26]
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2 • First Or iginal (Grey) COR
Ref. Circular of Requirements for Afloat Definitive
Care Facility T-AH(X) dated 31 July 1981, Department of the
Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C. 20362
The original COR, also known to the Naval Sea Systems
Command as the Grey COR, set requirements (not specifica-
tions) that resemble a Functional Baseline as set out in the
System Engineering Management Guide (p. 11-1). A Functional
Baseline is defined as follows, the functional baseline is
established at the of the CE (Concept Exploration) Phase.
The systems specification (Type A) (on development
specification, Type B, for smaller programs) defines the
technical portion of the program requirements. Normally the
initial system specification is included in the RFP and
provides the basis for contracting and controlling the system
design during the Demonstration/Validation (D/V) Phase. It
is the foundation for configuration management during the
subsequent phases of the program. Once the system
specification has been authenticated, formal configuration
control is initiated.
As mentioned previously the hospital ship program has
many unique aspects. Most specifications for the ship were
developed by the individual offeror's in response to the RFP.
Other ships constructed by NAVSEA would have voluminous
military specifications provided to the contractor which
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would form the Functional Baseline and progressing to the
second Allocated Baseline and final Product Baseline.
The first and subsequent COR's provided only
requirements that had to be met in responding to the series
of RFP ' s as mentioned in Chapter Four. These requirements,
although not considered specifications, can become quite
detailed. Appendix D, taken directly from the Grey COR [pp.
ii-iv] , represents aspects of a 'regular' configuration
management Functional, Allocated and Product Baseline.
Largely in response to financial pressures, some
major and many minor configuration changes were made to the
COR Requirements through the second 'Blue' COR, third 'Red'
COR and fourth 'yellow 1 COR. Rather than list all four
revisions and the third Table of Contents/List of Appendices,
the author has enclosed only the first and fourth COR's so
that the reader may compare for himself the extensive
configuration changes listed in Appendix B. [Ref. 61]
L. CONFIGURATION CONTROL BOARD
The Configuration Control Board (CCB) was the main TPC
integrating mechanism which resulted in the evolution of the
three preliminary and the final COR. The Configuration
Control Board (CCB) represents an important integration
mechanism for aligning the complex and competing Technical,
Political and Cultural influences within the hospital ship
project. CCB's are located at both the SUPSHIP and NAVSEA
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levels. They are a dynamic and organic mechanism for dealing
with TPC influences in the following components (TICHY, p.









Representatives from management and the functional areas
such as engineering, contracting and quality assurance come
together to work out their differences in finalizing the
decisions and documentation for the categories of
configuration managemnet changes. Most often the resultant
decisions are reached by consensus, particularly at the
SUPSHIP field activity level.
The CCB at the Naval Sea Systems Command level also uses
consensus but may have to resort to formal majority votes
when the TPC conflict influence among the NAVSEA, NAVMEDCOM
and MSC cannot be overcome. This evidently occurs rarely
since consensus is reached on most issues.
M. PROGRAM MANAGER PROPOSAL ( PMP
)
The Program Manager Proposal (PMP) is another major form
of Configuration Management documentation.
A PMP, is partially defined [Ref. 50:p. 1201] as "changes
that do not meet the policies, requirements, and procedures
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contained in this chapter shall be forwarded to the cognizant
Ship Acquisition Project Manager (SHAPM)."
The PMP Process is not actually part of the Configuration
Management Process but is an adjuct to it. It is a procedure
for managing change and the hospital ship project was subject
to it. In the four areas it was used, stored configuration
management documentation was utilized while the actual
approval process was elevated from the internal Naval Sea
Systems Command command structure to the Secretary of the
Navy.
The draft of the OPNAV Instruction on the Program
Management Proposal Process [Ref. 62 :p. 1] states:
The purpose of the Program Management Proposal process is
to provide a mechanism to regulate research and
development and to control configuration changes and
modifications which lead to increases in non-recurring,
recurring or support costs to ships, aircraft, missiles,
weapons, systems, combat vehicles and combat equipment
both during and subsequent to production.
1 . Background of the Program Manager Proposal Program
The PMP program [Ref. 62:pp. 1-2] was established in
1982 by SECNAV direction to control spiraling costs.
Initially only selected programs were required to submit
PMP ' s when a threshold was broken. The PMP program has
proven to be a valuable tool in managing configuration
control and cost, and has therefore been expanded to include
all Department of the Navy RDT&E, acquisition and retrofit
programs. Thresholds have been eliminated. The intent of
PMP control is to prevent unit cost growth and ' requirements
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creep' due to unnecessary configuration changes, adding
capabilities to existing systems or making improvements that
entail 'hidden' execution costs. Once a baseline is
established, either through an approved Operational
Requirement and its attendant approved PMP, an approved
milestone, a prior approved PMP or through a PPBS decision,
no changes will be made to that baseline without an approved
PMP or a subsequent PPBS change. This process will enforce
configuration freeze between milestones, ensuring block
upgrades and long range planning. Once approved, the PMP
shall be considered directive in nature. By their
signatures, the OPNAV Resource Sponsor certifies committment
to fund the proposed change, and the SYSCOM Commander
certifies the program is executable for the dollars
specified in the PMP. The approved PMP will be attached to
the existing program documentation and will be considered the
new program baseline.
The draft OPNAV Instruction states the submission
criteria must be submitted when there is a new operational
requirement, when a change is proposed for the approved
baseline, or when there is an increase in unit cost for the
system (hospital ship) in production. Discretion and the
political aspect of the TPC model come into play in the
change management process.
The instruction mentions that there may be
'fact-of-lif e ' changes [Ref. 62 :p. 3] to a program that may
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be beyond the control of the SYSCOM, Resource Sponsor or the
SECNAV. The four hospital ship changes that were handled as
PMPs could have been interpreted as • fact-of-lif e changes,
or as operational requirements, or as increases in unit cost.
In interviews with the Supervisor of Shipbuilding
Office, and the Program Manager's Office, it became clear to
the research that there are many subleties to the Political
process between these internal bodies of NAVSEASYSCOM, and
the 'external' bodies of OPNAV and SECNAV. The subleties
were such that no party would comment beyond the fact that
each instance had ' command interest ' to a degree that a PMP
was required. The main philosophy behind the PMP process
appears to be a concern for unit costs of new systems.
The hospital ship program consists of only two ships,
spread over a seven year construction life, and has a
relatively modest cost (under $100 million) compared to
billion dollar weapon systems. On this basis the PMP process
appears more appropriate for the major weapons systems than
for a 'minor' medical acquisition.
The Technical, Political and Cultural influences in
the hospital ship project are an integral part of the PMP
process. They are part of the decision to initiate a PMP,
and they are part of each step in the PMP approval chain.
This section on this type of change management mechanism will
conclude with an outline of how PMPs are reviewed [Ref. 62 :p.
6]:
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1. SUPSHIP San Diego to NAVSEASYSCOM Program
Manager's Office.
2. NAVSEASYSCOM to Resource Sponsor (in this case
OPNAV 093 & 42)
3. After completion of a review board the PMP is
forwarded to the Department of the Navy Program
Information Center (DONPIC), who forwards the
PMPs to the Chief of Naval Operations.
4. After approval by CNO , DONPIC forwards the PMPs
to he Office of Program Appraisal (OPA) which
coordinates within the Secretariat.
5. OPA forwards SECNAV decisions to DONPIC who sends
the PMP approval or rejection to OPNAV and
NAVSEASYSCOM.
At the time of the writing of this thesis. (June
1987), there were five hospital ship project PMPs in various
stages of approval. They were to add:
1. A sideport for patient access by boat,
2. 70,000 cubic feet of medical storage space,
3. A brig and master-at-arms office,
4. An undetermined amount of office/administrative
space and,
5. A CT scanner.
All PMP s would be added to both ships. The CT scanner is
the most notable of the five PMPs, and the most
controversial
.
N. EXAMPLE OF A MEDICAL PMP
The addition of a CT scanner to the hospital ships is an
example of incorrect input informaiton going into a good
configuration management control system. The CT scanner
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issue is also an example of flag officer influence,
congressional interest and local newspaper coverage. A local
newspaper in San Diego [Ref. 63, p.l] reported the issue as a
minor expose on the project, to the dismay of SUPSHIP San
Diego and NASSCO
.
In the article, a Navy spokesman in Washington, D.C. was
quoted as saying that "the Navy is studying the possibility
of adding CT scanners to the ships". Both ships are to have
standard X-ray equipment. Any analysis of the four revisions
of the 1C0R shows this to be true. The final COR calls for
(per ship) eight X-ray rooms with at least six of the eight
rooms "equipped with a 500 MA unit with fluoroscope and image
intersurfaction capability" (Yellow COR, p. 10).
The article went on to say that "Originally, the Navy had
rejected as impractical the idea of having CT scanners
aboard, but after a tour by some admirals last year, it (the
Navy) decided to reconsider the issue". The hospital ship
program has been the subject of intense flag officer
discussion since its inception, particularly among flag
officers in OPNAV, NAVSEASYSCOM, COMNAVMEDCOM, and MSC
.
To add to the bad impression left by this article, a
spokesman in the office of U.S. Senator Pete Wilson (R-Ca.)
added that "Serious questions would be raised if the Navy had
to rebuild part of the ships to add the equipment".
In addition, a local trauma center indicated: "We feel
that the CT scanner is crucial to care for patients. Regular
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skull X-rays are almost useless in letting us know what we
need to know. CT scanners have been widely used since the
mid-1970' s. Use of the scanners is the standard of care in
the community. By law, the Navy is required to provide care
equal to that in the civilian community".
Although this reporter put the issue in the worst light
possible, the CT scanner addition had been grinding through
the configuration management control process a year earlier.
No documentation exists on whether CT scanners were rejected
on technical, cost, supportability, or medical grounds
between 1981 and 1984 when the COR's were written and
revised. The issue was raised by many of bidders responding
to the RFP ' s issued by the Military Sealift Command and Naval
Sea Systems Command.
A precise history of the subject was provided by a
telephone interview [Ref. 64] with the assistant program
manager for the hospital ship project. This source stated
that the subject of the CT scanner came up a few times
between 1982 and 1985 but was never made part of the COR. In
mid-1985 OPNAV Code 04 directed that CT scanners be added to
the two hospital ships. Technical input was requested from
NAVMEDCOM, and NASSCO was directed to prepare an ECP for the
modification. A Program Manager Proposal (PMP) was submitted
to OPNAV but was first withdrawn, and later resubmitted.
One reason was that a NAVSEA contract consultant
(Designer's and Planner's) questioned the NAVMEDCOM choices
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for suitability for shipboard use. In response to this
NAVMEDCOM advised NAVSEA that the submitted models were not
equivalent and would have to be redone. In fact, two out of
three chosen companies later refused to sign a document
stating that their equipment would work on a ship. While the
ECP for installation was forwarded from NASSCO to NAVSEA (via
SUPSHIP San Diego) the PMP was still hung up in OPNAV because
NAVMEDCOM needed to provide new choices for CT scanners. A
PMP needs definite cost estimates to proceed through the
'chop-chains' at OPNAV. This 'old' PMP was withdrawn and a
new PMP was submitted in July 1986 with new choices of CT
scanners from NAVMEDCOM. By October 1986, the PMP had worked
it's way through OPNAV and was submitted to SECNAV where the
PMP was approved that month.
In 1987 the problem continued with funding of the PMP as
the main obstacle. Although the configuration control review
procedures functioned properly they do not address funding
concerns (nor are they designed to). Many configuration
changes are approved before the funding is finalized. NAVSEA
would prefer to have the funding first but three other PMP '
s
approved and awaiting funding are: additional medical
storage space, brig & master-at-arms space, and expanded
administrative space.
Also surprising is that in May/June 1987 there were
unfunded configuration management control proposals before
NAVSEA and OPNAV. Among these the controversial and
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expensive CAT scanners and three other program manager
proposal's (PMP's) already approved by OPNAV and awaiting
funding.
The literature and structure of configuration management
is for the most part silent on the subject of funding of
changes. The unspoken assumption is that time and effort
would not go into preparing any of the various documents,
from and ECP to a PMP , unless funding could be found. This
assumption, at least in the hospital ship project, is
threatened by fluctuating funding levels, and sources of
funding, for the ship (USNS MERCY)
.
The thesis author has to admit to feelings of surprise
and dismay upon reading this article. At best this placement
of the two hospital ships on a "Pentagon cut list" is a
budget battle ploy to press Congress for continued funding.
At worst this turn of events shows the continued lack of
priority 'medical readiness' is given when planning "combat
readiness'. The article appeared when the ySNS_COMFORT was
still being constructed at NASSCO and not 70% complete. It
is surprising in light of the many comments made by various
Pentagon officials supporting improved and increased medical
readiness
.
With the recurring battles over the Pentagon's budget
Military Medicine [Ref. 65:p. A10] states:
with the Navy nearing its 600 ship goal, the
government is discovering that there simply isn't enough
money to pay for the crews to operate the ships, or to
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maintain them. So, Pentagon planners, realizing that the
600-ship Navy will be a fleeting (no pun intended)
reality at best, are looking for ways to cut costs.
Given a choice between a big gray destroyer and a big
white hospital ship, the Navy prefers to keep the
warship. Last fall, the Pentagon announced that the
hospital ships were on a list of programs to be cut if
next year's (FY 88) Pentagon budget is cut ... a
skeleton crew will settle down to maintaining requested
modifications and additions to the two hospital ships.
Configuration management philosophy speaks of controlling
"unnecessary changes'. It is increasingly apparent that such
changes must not only be viewed in an engineering, technical,
or medical sense, but also in a funding sense. An
unnecessary change might be one in funding in unstable or
remote
.
Configuration management does address the impact of
changes on logistic support in a system, in this case the two
hospital ships. A proposed change might also be viewed as an
unnecessary one if the funding for the original modification
is unknown or probabilistic, the funding for logistic support
and life-cycle cost can only be more of an unknown. These
considerations should be discussed when deciding whether to
invest the time, effort, and money into proposing a
documented configuration management change and forwarding it
up the chain of command for approval
.
0. SIMA - SHORE INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE FACILITY
Configuration management changes have also occurred in
the hospital ship program between the date of acceptance of a
vessel after work was completed at NASSCO, and the departure
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date of the USNS_MERCY for it's humanitarian deployment to
the Philippines. Configuration management is very important
when a series of ships in a class are being constructed and
feedback from the fleet is used to aid construction in
subsequent ships.
The hospital ship program is unique (once again using
that overworked phrase) in that only two ships are being
constructed, one right after the other, with only limited
operational deployment feedback to aid in the construction of
the sister ship. Each ship will operate in widely different
environmental conditions and potential strategic scenarios.
The USNS MERCY will operate in the tropical climate of the
Pacific Ocean while the USNS COMFORT will operate in the
colder North Atlantic Ocean. The USNS MERCY will most likely
have to transit several thousand miles before reaching a
potential combat zone while the USNS COMFORT will have to
transit in a few short days to Europe to support any
potential NATO combat scenarios.
Some of these factors will influence configuration
management and control of the two ships. Even the specific
'personality 1 of each ship's crew, and command influence, can
influence configuration management of a hospital ship.
Example of some of these influences is demonstrated by the
modifications made to the USNS MERCY at the Shore




The USNS MERCY was affected by the timing of the
humanitarian deployment and the resulting rush to depart San
Diego on time in February 1986. Much of the work completed
at SIMA was out-of-scope on the NASSCO contract but
considered necessary for the humanitarian deployment. An
example of this would be expanded general storage areas
throughout the ship. In contrast, USNS COMFORT will not
install specific additional storage areas until a specific
operational assignment is made and the overall logistic
requirements are known.
Command influence or crew climate plays a large role in
the configuration of MSC and MTF administrative spaces which
will be different on each ship. Many of the changes can be
broken out in a separate list that can be shown to directly
result from the Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV),
while others will be lumped together on the SIMA list or Post
Delivery Availability work list. There were a multitude of
Technical, Political and Cultural influences at work in
interactions between SUPSHIP, the USNS MERCY, MSC,
COMNAVMEDCOM, NAVSEASYSCOM , OPNAV , SECNAV, INSURV and the
various 'visitors' from each of these political bodies.
It is beyond the scope and depth of this thesis to
attempt to trace each change to each interested party. This
thesis will list the changes to give a 'taste 1 of the changes
involved. Appendix E lists the changes completed or
contemplated at SIMA San Diego before the USNS MERCY departed
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for the Philippines. The bottom line
technical-political-cultural cost of these changes was
$449,630.10 [Ref. 66]
Appendix E also lists the changes to be completed during
the Post Delivery Availabiltiy period after the USNS MERCY
returns from the Philippines and homeports at the MSC
facility in Oakland.
Many of the changes were the result of INSURV
inspections, while others could not be completed at SIMA due
to time or, material constraints. The TPC influences of the
INSURV Board were particularly interesting due to Technical
interpretations of military versus commercial standards,
apparent Political friction between the INSURV Board and
NAVSEASYSCOM, and Cultural influences of inspecting US Navy
combatants/auxiliaries versus a hospital ship. Not much more
can be written due to the reluctance of all parties concerned
to talk about specific issues. Suffice it to say that a
large number of 'safety items' were generated by the INSURV
Board for NAVSEASYSCOM to correct.
A Navy Times Article [Ref. 67:p. 22] mentioned some of
the items to be added to the Post Delivery Availabilty list
that were discovered during the humanitarian deployment. The
article stated that "the ship is capable of receiving
casualties in wartime and of caring for them" Among the
changes mentioned were:
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several alterations, including changing some gravity-fed
medical equipment that doesn't operate properly in rough
seas and mounting an eyeglass lens grinder on gimbals.
Another may be to cut an opening near the waterline so
patients can be brought into the ship by boat. At
present the most convenient access to MERCY is by
helicopter. A second alteration may be to subdivide the
giant ballast tanks. When in heavy seas, water sloshing
in the tanks caused the ship to roll more than it should.
P . SUMMARY
The author asserts that only by understanding the nature
and influences within and without the hospital ship project
can a sound basis be prepared for the future logistics
support of the hospital ships. Configuration management and
control is the methodology for channeling the TPC influences
into the end product of a hospital ship. It is a continuing
configuration management program that will be of great
benefit to the individual hospital ship commands, and the
Naval Medical Command as a whole.
Although this thesis is restricted to identifying the TPC
influences and the management approval mechanisms they are
funneled through, there is an overall long term goal. Dean
[Ref. 68:p. 21] states it succinctly as "The purpose of
configuration management, at the bottom line, is to ensure
the continuing logistics supportabi 1 i ty of systems in the
government inventory."
One of the specific recommendations to result from the
thesis research is to recommend the writing of an instruction
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covering configuration management in a military health care
system
.
There is precedence for writing a separate instruction on
configuration management for the hospital ships. NAVMATINST
9020. IB entitled "Standards in Shipboard Command and Control
Space Configurations" [Ref. 70:p. 1] "requires that
application of configuration management be tailored,
carefully, total Navy material involved".




Conduct studies covering as many ship types and
classes as necessary for the purpose of
determining operational requirements and
developing optimum standard arrangements for each
ship type and class,
2. Develop standards which cover installations or
various ship types,
3. Establish documentation requirements, and provide
procedures to support each arrangement, and
4. Issue directives and monitor progress . . . and
adhere to the configurations and standards
prescribed
.
Since the Military Sealift Command has an established
system for the hull, deck and equipment spaces it appears
reasonable to have a specialized directive on configuration
management on the USNS MTF in particular, and afloat MTF ' s in
general. The ROS crews of the two hospital ships should be
particularly interested in MTC C. M. during routine
maintenance and space/equipment upgrade phases of the
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hospital ships. Configuration management needs to be an
ongoing effort on the two hospital ships.
As mentioned before, a formal configuration management
system is an excellent way of managing the inevitable TPC
influences in any ongoing or future medical treatment
facility construction effort. There is support for such an






The overall theme of thesis has been the management of
change as expressed in the evolution of American and
International hospital ships. In order to manage change in a
health care environment one must first identify the various
Technical, Political and Cultural (TPC) influences present in
such an environment. The first step is to identify each
influence and their discrete or combined effects on the
project in question.
Configuration Management (CM) was selected as a
management vehicle for identifying, controlling and
coordinating TPC influences in constructing and operating
American hospital ships. CM has the virtue of being an
accepted and well established method for constructing and
operating Department of Defense systems. Managers can
utilize the procedures and integration mechanisms within CM
to deal with TPC influences as they arise within the system
life cycle.
Following a brief background on the use of the TPC Theory
in a health care environment, the TPC Theory advocated by
Tichy was then explained in some detail. While still only a
meta-theory "... a framework for working with
organizational problems . . . " [Ref. l:p. ix] , the thesis
author uses TPC Theory to categorize the many pressures and
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influences at work within the 1980' s hospital ship program.
TPC Theory provides a rationale to organize influences into
three main categories. It also provides the idea of
integration mechanisms to utilize the TPC influences in a
productive way. The procedures of Configuration Management
(CM) were thus viewed in a new perspective and the management
and integrative aspects of CM were outlined.
The research delved into the historical evolution of
American and International hospital ships. In each chapter
it was the author's belief that the discrete and combined
effects of TPC influences would be expressed in the final
design configuration of the vessel and the onboard medical
treatment facility. All TPC influences gleaned from the
available literature were identified and discussed. The
commentary was of a macro perspective due to the dearth of
research materials available. Technical and Political
influences were more readily identifiable than Cultural
influences
.
Chapter IV provided the best ' laboratory' for the
utilization of TPC influences in a Configuration Management
(CM) health care environment. The research effort was two
pronged: 1) after the fact with the USNS MERCY and 2) an
ongoing construction effort with the USNS COMFORT. Some
literature was also available on the deployment phase of the
USNS_MERCY to the Philippines.
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A much more detailed research effort and accompanying
micro perspective was available in analyzing and identifying
TPC influences in the 1980' s hospital ship program.
Voluminous CM data and documentation was also available to
observe the effects of various TPC influences within and
without the hospital ship project. The detailed discussion
of TPC influences in Chapter IV and the management mechanisms
of Configuration Management in Chapter V have lead the author
to make the recommendations listed in the following section.
Hopefully the thesis research into a pragmatic application of
TPC Theory to this type of health care environment will
contribute to the movement of TPC Theory from a meta-theory
to a more formal theory.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Future construction of hospital ships should
include a formal performance feedback mechanism
between hospital ships deployed and hospital
ships still under construction. Such feedback
will result in improved Configuration Management
in minimizing unnecessary changes, and in
improving modifications still under construction.
2. Liaison planning between the Board of Inspection
and Survey (INSURV) and the program sponsor
(OPNAV) must be greatly improved regarding
inspection standards in judging future hospital
ships built to Commercial, Bureau of American
Shipping, U. S. Coast Guard, Military Sealift
Command, and Military Standards.
3. The Naval Sea Systems Command and the Supervisor
of Ship Building should develop a formal matrix
plan listing all conflicting standards and
specifications. This plan would function as an
aid in resolving conflicts in the construction of
future hospital ships.
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The Office of the Surgeon General and Commander,
Naval Medical Command should develop a
Medical/Dental Configuration Control Board whose
decisions are final. The composition of the
Board is not as important as the need to have one
point-of-control with the Naval Sea Systems
Command in the construction of future hospital
ships
.
All Configuration Management changes should be
reviewed with probability of successfully
obtaining funding for the proposed change with
review mechanisms in place at the SUPSHIP, NAVSEA
and OPNAV levels of approval. Consideration of
funding the proposed change should include
logistic support, and life cycle cost
consequences, not just the original cost of the
modification.
NAVMEDCOM and MSC proposals for Configuration
Management changes as inputs into the CM process
should include 'financial impact statements' with
original cost, logistic support and life cycle
costs, and identifying funding sources and
(initial) probability of success in obtaining
such funding. Such a procedure helps justify a
modification as 'needed 1 .
At the various levels of approval for different
Configuration Management changes, a review
mechanism should rank and prioritize all
requests, not only on engineering, technical and
medical grounds, but also on financial grounds.
This aids in utilizing the Configuration
Management process in a 'systems approach 1
instead of viewing each proposed change and its
impact in isolation.
NAVSEA should maintain an archive of all
proposed, implemented and discarded Configuration
Management changes to the hospital ship project.
This goes beyond the minimum required by
Configuration Management regulations with the
emphasis on the history and alternative
rationales for the decision to implement, or not
to make the change. One example would be the
documented reasoning for the actual and proposed
changes to the four (published and unpublished)
revisions of the 'Circular of Requirements for
Afloat Definitive Care Facility T-AH (x) '
.
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9. After the hospital ships enter their respective
home ports in a reduced operating status, copies
of the Configuration Management archive should be
transferred to the Military Sealift Command
maintenance facility in charge of each ship and
to the Command of each hospital ship. Proposed
changes can be measured against the archive
rationale for deferral or rejection when
Configuration Management changes are contemplated
at future SUPSHIP or SIMA facilities.
10. An education and awareness campaign should be a
duty of future hospital ship commands on
Configuration Management procedures and
philosophy in general, and the timing of changes
in particular. This program would be directed at







Length Overall 894 ' - 0"
Beam 105 ' - 9"
Draft , Design 32 ' - 9"
Displacement (S.W. at Design Draft) 69,360 Long Tons
Speed (at 80% ABS SHIP, Design Draft) 17.5 knots
Mission
:
Primary Mission: To provide acute medical and surgical car
in support of Rapid Deployment Forces, U.S. Marine Amphibious
Task Forces, and Forward Deployed Navy Fleet activities
located in hostile areas.
Secondary Mission: To provide a full-service hospital
facility that can be deployed world-wide to support disaster
relief operations.
Patient Care Facilities:
Patient care wards (each ship)
Intensive Care Wards 80 beds
Recovery Wards 20 beds
Intermediate Care Wards 280 beds
Light Care Wards 120 beds
Limited Care Wards 500 beds
Total Patient Capacity 1000 beds
Operating rooms (each ship) 12




Main laboratory plus satellite lab
Central sterile receiving
Medical supply/pharmacy





Oxygen producing plants (two)
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Hull Arrangement:
Raised forecastle, transom stern, bulbous bow, extended
deckhouse with forward bridge, helicopter landing deck with
flight control facility.




Main propulsion type Single screw, geared steam
turbine
Shaft Horsepower 24 , 500
Fuel DFM
Endurance (at sustained speed) 13,420 nautical miles
Additional features include three 2000 KW auxiliary diesel
generators for medical space support, with one 1500 KW
emergency diesel generator for backup; one 1000 KW ship's
service turbo-generator with one 750 KW emergency diesel
generator for backup; four 75,000 gallon per day distilling
plants; and three 400 ton air conditioning plants.
Hull Machinery:
Two forward and two aft mooring winches
Nine 7500 pound capacity elevators
Two 1000 pound capacity medical supply lifts
One 3 ton stores crane






Air control and aviation navigation aids including TACAN
Gyro compass, course recorder and repeaters
Dual control gyropilot steering system




Firemain system throughout ship
Halon flooding in diesel engine enslosures and 02
Foam system in machinery spaces
AFFF system for helo deck
Li f eboats
Life rafts
[Ref. NASSCO Tour Package]
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Figure 1.5 Deck Arrangements.
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Figure 1.6 Bow Inboard Profile.
142
— 43 QC




The appended NAVSEASYSCOM contract excerpts,
configuration management documents and SIMA San Diego
modifications do not reflect final settlement costs! They
are enclosed in the thesis only to give some idea of the
bottom line financial impact of TPC influences in the
hospital ship project. Any and all figures could remain the
same, go up, or down--final settlement on such a contract can
take up to ten years to complete.
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sodtr, Irval S«« Systems Conaud
Washington, S.C. 20362
Buyer/Symbol: k. J. O'Neill /SEA 02_24
Tnone: Area Code 202/692-7517
31220
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion
and Repair, USN
Naval Station, 3o*119
San Diego, CA 92136
M171\
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' National Steel & Shipbuilding Co. '
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WHEREAS, the contractor's proposal for this contract was baser) on the conversion
of San Clemente Tankers in accordance with the provisions of this contract and
the contractor's proposal and the prices set forth in this contract are based on
acquisition of these vessels from Apex Marine Corporation, First Pennsylvania
Sank N.A. (as trustee), Worth Oil Transport Company, and Nprthwest Shipping Corp.
(collectively "Apex") for an estimated acquisition* cost of $30 million for each
vessel based on the vessels meeting the classification of the American Bureau of
Shipping (ABS) in effect on the date of Agreement of Sale between the Contractor
and such other certification from the Coast Guard as would be necessary if the
vessel were to remain in service as a commercial tank vessel,
NOW, THEREFORE, the contractor agrees to use his best efforts to acquire the
vessels from Apex for an acquisition cost of less than S30 million per vessel.
W otfeicioa/a^aca • wo 9 ax** *m «• arv«M.
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Page 2 of 2
FURTHER, 1f the contractor acquires any vessel to be converted for a cost less
than $30 million based on the vessel's meeting the standards described 1n the
first paragraph above, the contract price for the ships under this Contract will
be reduced by an equitable adjustment to cover the difference between $30
million and the contractor's cost for the vessel.
The contractor 1s to advise the Procuring Contracting Officer within 120 days of
this modification of the actions taken to implement the above and to reduce the
acquisition costs of the vessels to be converted under this contract. The
contractor shall promptly notify the Procuring Contracting Officer of any cir-
cumstances that prohibit the successful accomplishment of the above or which
may affect delivery of the ships.
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From: EMC Steven A. Cushman
To: Lt. William Roberts
Subj: USNS Mercy's SIMA Availability jobs
1. Enclosed is a copy of the lessons learned letter by the Assistant
Repair Ufficer in charge of Mercy's work. It refers to a Supply Dept.
lessons letter, this letter was never written. Also enclosed is a
list of the jobs we worked with some explanatory notes.
2. Accounting data given below includes the totals for contracted
jobs and all material and parts SIMA ordered to complete the work.
AMOUNT
3. Just in case you don't already have it, my point of contact with
MSC was:







4. If any other information or more detail is needed feel free to
contact me again.
Very Respectfully,
EMC Steven A. Cushman
Commanding Officer
Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity, San Oiego
Naval Station, Box 106





The appended NAVSEASYSCOM contract excerpts,
configuration management documents and SIMA San Diego
modifications do not reflect final settlement costs! They
are enclosed in the thesis only to give some idea of the
bottom line financial impact of TPC influences in the
hospital ship project. Any and all figures could remain the
same, go up, or down— final settlement on such a contract can
take up to ten years to complete.
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